Can Akrasia Ever Be Rational

 Introduction

Every day we like to think we are in control of our thoughts and actions and that they are leading to the goals we and others set. However, on those occasions when we feel we ought to get up but hit snooze for the nth time or when we fail to act when required, are these weaknesses of will ever rational? By looking at the components of Akrasia and rationality some criteria for that circumstance are developed with models of reality and a scenario to see if Akrasia can be rational.

Definition of Akrasia

Akrasia is a condition where although we know what it would be best to do, we do something else. Translated literally as a ‘lack of self-control’ but is generally considered to be more of a weakness of will that leads to us acting contrary to our judgement particularly when actions are guided by our moral principles or long-term goals (Steward, 2005). This has been debated since the Socratic equation, which proposed knowing a thing to be good means we desire it (Blackburn, 2016). Furthermore, not only do we desire it, but it would be impossible for us not to perform the action which we know to be best (Steward, 2005). The nuance in the Protagoras is that if we do not act on our thoughts then we didn’t really know them to be best (Jowett, 2020).

Logically formulated “Joseph did f rather than e, even though he was convinced that e was the better thing to do all things considered” (Stroud & Svirsky, 2019)

Definition of Rational

Behaviour, beliefs, arguments, policies, and other exercises that make sense, are appropriate or required or in accordance with some acknowledged goal can be rational (Blackburn, 2016). When considering Akrasia the form of rationality that is most applicable is our notions of practical reasoning. The form of reason that directs, motivates, plans, evaluates, and predicts actions. It also includes how we define rational ends and guidance on how action should be guided given multiple ends (Hampton, 2005).

More specific definitions of subjective vs objective rationality and other methods of adding degrees exist but I will only argue for it meeting rationality's lowest or general criteria (Tappolet, 2016).

Criteria by which Akrasia could be rational

To construct a route to arguing that Akrasia can be rational a set of criteria that allow at least one instance of it to be considered both Akratic and rational is needed. Firstly, the link between our thoughts or actions, that the Socratic equation of knowing something to be good means taking actions towards it must be broken. This allows for Akrasia to be true.

The second piece must be our inability to know everything. Socrates’s challenge lies in us thinking one thing and being unaware of our true beliefs. Although it is possible for us to not know our own beliefs there is also information that we do not have or are not aware of best described by theories on Information which assert we do not have perfect knowledge but a constant battle against uncertainty (Adriaans, 2020). This would allow for our thought of possible actions, that at the time do not appear rational in fact have a greater probability of reaching our goals than those we are conscious of.

Our imperfect knowledge must also be considered when looking at our goals. They are not fixed but constantly challenged by what we learn from experiences we encounter day to day. A scenario where a better goal is discovered from an action or lack of action may in hindsight be considered a more rational choice.

Changing goals and thoughts means that in hindsight rational action can appear out of what would be considered irrational at the time. This combined with the complexity of our lives presents us with not just a singular goal but many and our ability to perfectly call what goals, thoughts and actions are rational at the time to the end of time but rather themselves gain or lose certainty based on increased understanding.

Akrasia would be rationale if:

1. ·       Thoughts do not have to lead to actions
2. ·       Uncertainty can lead us to better goals, thoughts, and actions allowing each of them to be rational or irrational
3. ·       We are more than just our conscious self, those unconscious systems are capable of actions we could consider rational
4. ·       Not all goals and thoughts are immediately expressible
5. ·       Rational thoughts and actions can be considered as such in hindsight if they move towards a goal

Goals, Thoughts, Actions and Errors

To explore what could meet the criteria a few Models of ourselves and our world can help link the elements, the following models use Archimate which can encapsulate processes, information, systems and their relationships which gets close to the concepts we need to break down any part of reality (McCumiskey, 2020).

Figure 1: Breakdown of Information flow within an Animal in a timebound world

Figure one shows a world that is composed of many parts, one key piece is conscious animals such as humans and another is time that breaks up that world into a continuous series of differing states. We perform actions from one state to another based on the sensory information we receive about the world and our conscious thoughts about it. We also have during each moment the influence of memories which provide us with a compressed view of past sensory information and thoughts. A broadened structure of one that is used in the perceptual model of emotions (McCumiskey, 2020). This provides a convincing view that our thoughts and actions are not inextricably linked but can in certain instances act independently of one another.

As seconds, minutes, hours, days and months pass our unconscious systems continuously take actions of which some are influenced by our conscious responses to experiential information. These actions, or in the occasional instance of akrasia, non-actions are based on information. This constant loop of thoughts and actions in our strange loop can over time exhibit goals towards future states of the world and ourselves (Hofstader, 2007). Given the constraint of time, we sometimes take actions with very little conscious thought, of which I refer to instances of behavioural and communicative actions towards ourselves and others rather than mechanical actions like walking. Over time we may rethink our pattern of behaviour, but we can perform actions with very little or no thought with a pattern that leads us towards our goals or in such a way that we might start to change our goals based on feedback. Our weakness of will is never more present than our inability to change these behaviours, we may think all we want when depressed is that we should get up, clean our room, or go out with friends but it does not mean that we do this, sometimes for months on end. It is however this strange force that also seems to drive us towards people we like or love, a lack of self-control for our good as well as bad.

This is similar to Tappolet’s view of a self-monitoring Reason-responsive agent that is not just tracking reasons that cross past the agent’s mind but are actively acted upon was sufficient confidence in a particular course is warranted (Tappolet, 2016).

Figure 2: Mental Information Breakdown

Those unconscious actions that we observe to understand our pattern of behaviour is not the only type. I submit that we also have ideas we are entirely conscious of but cannot express in natural language to either our mind or others as broken down by figure 2 (McCumiskey, 2020).  This however although made up of our mental information from our memory and sensory information at the time could not be used to explain Akrasia as it is not a loss of will or self-control. They are however our means of looking back and assessing all of our actions, even the ones that were unconscious, more like sensory perceptions of emotions than things that felt like a conscious actions.

All of the former is complicated further by us having myriad goals and thoughts which some of the time overlap or compete with one another for primacy. Complex frameworks have been developed, such as those used by rational choice theory, the theory that mathematical models can predict and guide our economic, societal and behavioural choices (Hardin, 2005). Those frameworks base a lot of their understanding on Game Theory and other mathematical models that capture the possible decisions in certain scenarios. Within these scenarios there is room for error that each of our conscious or unconscious thoughts that lead to action have a probability of success, an impact should they fail, the proximity of influence and value were they to succeed (Axelos, 2010). This puts into question the stance that rationality comes from judgements that then proceed to actions rather than a more complex loop that involves unconscious and conscious interaction and a trend towards our goals over time with the trend being where the true rational or irrational assessment should lie (Stroud & Svirsky, 2019).

Constraining our rationality to just conscious thought and not allowing actions from our unconscious would potentially limit the set of possible actions that would allow us to achieve our goals. We cannot easily analyse when performing actions, whether our gut feelings, inexpressible ideas or articulated points will allow us to obtain a good goal or show our goal was flawed and lead us to a better end. The less time we have the even more uncertain the correct path may appear leading us to reasonably go with a course that at the time feels like a loss of control or a weak-willed action but may in fact over time be shown to be the rational action to have performed.

Scenario

Scenarios, where the criteria are met, are best articulated by stories like Adventures of Huckleberry Fin (Tappolet, 2016), The Secret Life of Walter Mitty and more recently Dreamwork’s How to Train your Dragon.

How to Train Your Dragon is set on the island of Berk one of the main characters Hiccup is brought up in a town of Vikings whose culture revolves around killing dragons. To win his father's approval and greater standing in the town hiccup sets a goal to kill a dragon. Unlike the rest of the town, Hiccup is focused on technological problems and logical thinking.

During an attack on the village by dragons, Hiccup utilises one of these contraptions, successfully bringing down a dragon. Hiccup upon finding where the dragon fell realises, he only wounded the creature. With it, at his mercy and with all his long-held goals set to be fulfilled he struggles to plunge his dagger into the dragon’s beating heart and instead frees it. His thoughts and actions do not align, and he does not know why he couldn’t bring himself to do it. At this moment the rationality of this action can be questioned as he has failed the town and placed himself in mortal danger of reciprocity from the dragon.

He is also spared and from this moment starts learning more about the dragon, Toothless, and begins to strike up a friendship. One which ironically makes him the best dragon wrangler in training but also puts into question the town’s aggressive stance towards the dragons.

He can only articulate this later when pushed why he couldn’t do it, finally explaining that he believes that the dragon and he were the same and by implication the town and the dragons. Both were just trying to survive and have a common enemy. Their main goal is the same and by sparring with Toothless they must now all change their thoughts about the Dragon threat to a friendlier position if they are to survive.

Upon defeating this enemy Hiccup achieves his father’s and the town’s approval and with the dragons now part of the town their world is significantly better. Without Hiccup’s weakness of will, followed by questioning his thoughts and learning to articulate them none of them ever move to a better place. When looking back the action he did not perform when he lost his self-control to execute his goals was entirely rational and the best action to move him and the town towards being able to survive.

This does not make all instances of Akrasia rational, but it does make it possible. Given this, there are further considerations around the degree of rationality Akrasia can be attributed with (Tappolet, 2016) and the framework for practical reasoning that would allow us to obtain the best chance of becoming aware of those moments (Hampton, 2005).

Conclusion

Akrasia can be Rational, our brains are not entirely conscious but capable of actions due to the necessity of time. This can lead to moments when we cannot master our actions with our conscious will leading us to do f rather than e, even though he was convinced that e was the better thing to do all things considered (Stroud & Svirsky, 2019). Those moments however when looked back on as a trend towards a goal can be the best possible action we could have taken. Explored briefly through the akratic action of Hiccup in How to Train your Dragon, which led to the best possible outcome. The potential errors in all of our goals, thoughts and actions leave room for actions to be rational and our conscious thoughts to be irrational despite feeling like they are at the time. Our frameworks of practical reasoning need to account for this and be moved to look at the strange loop of information that our minds are to ensure they do not lead to irrational actions by just looking at point decisions based on an assumption of perfect knowledge.

Figures

Figure 1: Breakdown of Information flow within an Animal in a timebound world. 2

Figure 2: Mental Information Breakdown. 3

 

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