Introduction
We all have difficult decisions to make, sometimes those
decisions although difficult to not violate or strain our moral judgments.
However some decisions do, they put us and others in a scenario where a right
or wrong action is harder to settle upon. Dirty Hands is one of these types of
scenario. This essay will look to lay out the components of dirty hands
scenarios and understand if it represents a problem for a or all of our moral
systems.
What is a scenario of ‘Dirty Hands’
Figure 1: Core components of the situation of Dirty
Hands
From the Greeks to Shakespeare and beyond people have been
writing about scenarios where hands are dirtied
Beyond Walzer there are a range of views that look to
understand the exact implications of the scenario of dirty hands, with some concluding
that there is a problem of ‘dirty hands’, whilst others deny that
The scenarios given across the majority of the sources
referenced in this paper generally use a political scenario but some use events
in ordinary life. For example, the act of terror to be stopped by a politician
The agents within the dirty hands scenario are normally
described as the one who has the decision to make, the politician or Captain
Vere, the collection of innocent agents that will be affected by the decision,
such as the people or Billy Budd and the hostile agent, the terrorist or
Claggart who has brought about the scenario that forces the decision. It is
possible that the hostile agent may not be an agent but merely an environmental
force that demands action.
The available actions to the agent are usually laid out as
one when no action will incur a steep cost, usually the lives of the innocents
involved and some options that go against normative prima facie moral actions
but seem necessary or obligatory to avoid the worst consequences. The
politician is faced with torturing the terrorist to obtain the location of a
bomb and Vere’s is faced with condemning innocent Billy to death to uphold the
maritime law. There is always a set of possible options that to prima facie or
normative moral rules or principles would be considered wrong. Those actions
must not only be usually wrong but in the specific scenario be both justified
and obligatory
Dirty hands scenarios are not always considered a moral
dilemma. Just acts that are usually moral but the bad act is akin to a moral
obligation and therefore there may be a good act but one that is not always
good depending on the consequences
The consequences of doing nothing as mentioned before
normally have a steep cost. The consequences of the actions however would dirty
the hands of the agent seen as one of guilt when judged against prima facie,
normative or existing legal standards as well as the psychological cost and
loss of integrity to the individual who took the action. The politician saves
the innocent but tortures an individual and Captain Vere’s protects the law but
kills the innocent billy.
The rightness, wrongness and dirtying of hands require a
Moral System. The cases referenced and debated are seen through the paradigm of
a Deontological or Consequentialist theory of ethics. The Deontological System
looks at the morality of our choices, critically that these choices should be
judged by their own merit and not the state they bring about. This stands in
contrast to a consequentialist view that focuses on the end state and not the
choice, ‘the means justify the ends
The actual outcome is important within Machiavelli’s work as
only effective immoral acts are acceptable, we do not want ineffective rulers
The final piece of the puzzle is that, having determined
that if the agent has performed a wrong action, there is the question as to
whether the agent with dirty hands should be punished or not and what that
punishment should be. This is explored by Susan Mendus through the case of Billy
Budd and the conclusion that Vere’s has done wrong and carries this remorseless
guilt to his grave
A dirty hands scenario is one that leaves us with the idea
of inescapable wrongdoing. That there are a set of actions, each of which are
wrong in a normative or prima facie sense but necessary to avoid a greater evil
and the agent that makes the decision may be effective or ineffective with the
chance of judgement from the law or their own conscience.
Is there a Problem?
Figure 3: Classification of an action and the
divisions that would lead to Dirty Hands coloured in blue. Further elements
added with Green indicating no Dirty Hands, Amber Dirty Hands but no punishment
and Red as Dirty Hands with Punishment
Walzer concludes that these situations cause a problem due
to the fact that in these instances certain agents appear that they must
perform an act generally considered to be wrong in order to do the right thing
and that it is their obligation in the role that they hold to do it, yet they
have ‘dirty hands’ from doing so
Nielson agrees there are circumstances where individuals or
groups have to perform actions that under normal circumstances would be
completely unacceptable, often choosing the lesser evil
Each of the consequentialist systems or the complex set of
overriding rules rely on the decision-making agent or those judging them after
that fact making the correct decision. To do this they have to understand the
set of available actions, the likely outcomes and the chances of one set
leading to the other. There is also after the scenario is complete the
information on the actual outcome and whether it was indeed the right thing to
do, either through the effectiveness of the action taken and the state attained
or how we morally judge the events after the fact.
Information is, however, never perfect, seen as a reduces
uncertainty but never entirely eliminating it
Considering the actions and consequences will always be
known eventually in these scenarios
This I believe is the first type of problem of dirty hands.
Where through prima facie overriding rules or a consequentialist outlook we
allow ourselves through error or the unpredictable spread of intolerable acts
erode the moral standing of not just the deciding agent but everyone who takes
no appropriate action against them. There is a case for rule-based
utilitarianism to use the scenario to generate new rules to avoid the first
type of issue where the guilty are seen as not guilty but cannot escape error
Considering the actions and consequences will always be
known eventually in these scenarios
The second type of Dirty Hands issue is with guilty but
forgivable or unforgivable act or consequences, where I consider unforgivable
as a crime that is punished. This is the case of Billy Budd where the law,
similar to the hard rules of a deontological moral system punish someone who
has committed a usually unspeakable act but had to do so in extremis or supreme
emergency in the politician's case. The issue with absolute principles is one
of inaction or incorrectly punished moral action. I will not tackle non-action
but note it should also be considered an action that like the action and
consequences of dirty hands should be judged as not guilty, forgivable or
unforgivable to avoid further gaps in our moral systems.
Unlike the infinite game of society, there are circumstances
where we are locked in a finite game, where the individuals either win, in the
cases discussed survive or don’t. A good example of forgiveness is R v Dudley
and Stephens, an English criminal case where the survivors of a shipwreck
cannibalised one of their number
Some acts may indeed be necessary but unforgivable. We might
need moral and psychological sacrifice to make the system work of our
politicians or empowered individuals
Conclusion
Yes, there is a problem of dirty hands, scenarios that leave
us with the idea of inescapable wrongdoing. Whether it be from error and the
spread of unacceptable norms left open by consequentialist thinking or the
potential merciless results of simple rules for complex scenarios allowed by
deontological systems. The problem is not with the scenarios but with our
thinking about moral systems, which in order to be complete must explain to us
how they deal with gaps, forgive or punish appropriately and handle errors over
the infinite game that is our social existence and the finite game of our
individual existence.
Table of Figures
Figure 1: Core components of the situation of Dirty
Hands
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