What is meant by ‘dirty hands’, and is there a problem of dirty hands?

Introduction

We all have difficult decisions to make, sometimes those decisions although difficult to not violate or strain our moral judgments. However some decisions do, they put us and others in a scenario where a right or wrong action is harder to settle upon. Dirty Hands is one of these types of scenario. This essay will look to lay out the components of dirty hands scenarios and understand if it represents a problem for a or all of our moral systems.

What is a scenario of ‘Dirty Hands’

Figure 1: Core components of the situation of Dirty Hands

From the Greeks to Shakespeare and beyond people have been writing about scenarios where hands are dirtied (Wijze, 2005). Clear formulations of why it is the case that it is the right thing to do wrong arrived with Machiavelli and his guidance for Princes (Tillyris, 2015). With plays that offer a view on the problem by Sartre’ and Brecht heavily influenced the modern version of the scenario (Nielson, 1996). The most influential of which is by Michael Walzer who proposes a situation where someone must choose between two options, both of which would be morally wrong (Walzer, 1973). This breach of normative or prima facie moral rules, where prima facie is considered to be a genuine obligation that may have to yield to other pressing higher-ranked obligations based on utility or some other sort of ranking and normative as what we ought to do (Blackburn, 2016).

Beyond Walzer there are a range of views that look to understand the exact implications of the scenario of dirty hands, with some concluding that there is a problem of ‘dirty hands’, whilst others deny that (Coady, 2018). It is probably best understood by breaking the scenario of dirty hands into its component parts.

The scenarios given across the majority of the sources referenced in this paper generally use a political scenario but some use events in ordinary life. For example, the act of terror to be stopped by a politician (Meisels, 2008) or Herman Melville’s Billy Budd which sees Billy murder Claggart who sought his death through mutiny laws (Melville, 1924). What they have in common is that they are not common occurrences and generally include impactful acts and consequences.

The agents within the dirty hands scenario are normally described as the one who has the decision to make, the politician or Captain Vere, the collection of innocent agents that will be affected by the decision, such as the people or Billy Budd and the hostile agent, the terrorist or Claggart who has brought about the scenario that forces the decision. It is possible that the hostile agent may not be an agent but merely an environmental force that demands action.

The available actions to the agent are usually laid out as one when no action will incur a steep cost, usually the lives of the innocents involved and some options that go against normative prima facie moral actions but seem necessary or obligatory to avoid the worst consequences. The politician is faced with torturing the terrorist to obtain the location of a bomb and Vere’s is faced with condemning innocent Billy to death to uphold the maritime law. There is always a set of possible options that to prima facie or normative moral rules or principles would be considered wrong. Those actions must not only be usually wrong but in the specific scenario be both justified and obligatory (Stoker, 1991). When there are 2 or more options both the act and the consequences are assessed to understand which is the lesser evils (Wijze & Goodwin, 2009)

Dirty hands scenarios are not always considered a moral dilemma. Just acts that are usually moral but the bad act is akin to a moral obligation and therefore there may be a good act but one that is not always good depending on the consequences (Wijze, 2005). Taking a Dilemma as a scenario where the agent is required to enact one of two or more actions the doing of which see the agent condemned to moral failure; no matter what they do (McConnell, 2018).

The consequences of doing nothing as mentioned before normally have a steep cost. The consequences of the actions however would dirty the hands of the agent seen as one of guilt when judged against prima facie, normative or existing legal standards as well as the psychological cost and loss of integrity to the individual who took the action. The politician saves the innocent but tortures an individual and Captain Vere’s protects the law but kills the innocent billy.

The rightness, wrongness and dirtying of hands require a Moral System. The cases referenced and debated are seen through the paradigm of a Deontological or Consequentialist theory of ethics. The Deontological System looks at the morality of our choices, critically that these choices should be judged by their own merit and not the state they bring about. This stands in contrast to a consequentialist view that focuses on the end state and not the choice, ‘the means justify the ends (Alexander & Moore, 2020).For example, a deontological approach would claim that both Vere’s and the Politician are wrong to torture or kill an individual or an innocent. A consequentialist would argue that by upholding the maritime law more lives would be saved, just like the lives saved by the politicians decisive action.

The actual outcome is important within Machiavelli’s work as only effective immoral acts are acceptable, we do not want ineffective rulers (Machiavelli, 2004). The effectiveness or intended effectiveness is what most of the papers focus on but this dimension should not be forgotten.

The final piece of the puzzle is that, having determined that if the agent has performed a wrong action, there is the question as to whether the agent with dirty hands should be punished or not and what that punishment should be. This is explored by Susan Mendus through the case of Billy Budd and the conclusion that Vere’s has done wrong and carries this remorseless guilt to his grave (Mendus, 2007). The politician in a nation that has laws against punishment would receive whatever sentence the judiciary body would deem appropriate, explored in the most detail by Meisels and the possible guilt those judiciary bodies or the public would incur by not punishing immoral or illegal acts (Meisels, 2008).

Figure 2: Classification of an action and the divisions that would lead to Dirty Hands coloured in blue

A dirty hands scenario is one that leaves us with the idea of inescapable wrongdoing. That there are a set of actions, each of which are wrong in a normative or prima facie sense but necessary to avoid a greater evil and the agent that makes the decision may be effective or ineffective with the chance of judgement from the law or their own conscience.

Is there a Problem?

Figure 3: Classification of an action and the divisions that would lead to Dirty Hands coloured in blue. Further elements added with Green indicating no Dirty Hands, Amber Dirty Hands but no punishment and Red as Dirty Hands with Punishment

Walzer concludes that these situations cause a problem due to the fact that in these instances certain agents appear that they must perform an act generally considered to be wrong in order to do the right thing and that it is their obligation in the role that they hold to do it, yet they have ‘dirty hands’ from doing so (Walzer, 1973). Is it wrong that to do right we must do wrong?

Nielson agrees there are circumstances where individuals or groups have to perform actions that under normal circumstances would be completely unacceptable, often choosing the lesser evil (Nielson, 1996). However, in his response to De Wijze, Nielson outlines that despite the fact that these actions are normally wrong in the circumstances given they are the right. This is generally the consequentialist viewpoint or that of overriding moral rules, that having calculated the utility of the outcomes, we arrive at an action that is the right one, torture the terrorist or kill Billy.

Each of the consequentialist systems or the complex set of overriding rules rely on the decision-making agent or those judging them after that fact making the correct decision. To do this they have to understand the set of available actions, the likely outcomes and the chances of one set leading to the other. There is also after the scenario is complete the information on the actual outcome and whether it was indeed the right thing to do, either through the effectiveness of the action taken and the state attained or how we morally judge the events after the fact.

Information is, however, never perfect, seen as a reduces uncertainty but never entirely eliminating it (Adriaans, 2021). The point at which an act utilitarian performs their calculations of the best action will not always be correct. There is a chance that after the fact we relook at what we did and realise that it was not overall good than some other options that were on the table. We land on whether the act performed in trying circumstances is no longer simply not guilty but guilty in a forgivable sense or unforgivable and requiring of punishment. These errors are not just based on physical information but how semantic information is true or not true and even through reason never entirely uncertain (Floridi, 2011). A response might be to invoke Mackie’ Moral Error Theory and claim that Moral properties could not exist in reality and therefore my trying to create the statement s in the first place is the mistake (Kalf, 2019). However, I feel this would be a difficult stance for a consequentialist to take as the foundation of utilitarianism is the use of information about states to make moral judgements.

Considering the actions and consequences will always be known eventually in these scenarios (Coady, 2004). We must consider if even though for the survival of our society we may require those in power to make difficult decisions the possibility of an error should also concern us. Furthermore spread of new ways of thinking spread, the very scenarios we discuss for Dirty Hands generally have agents with opposing objectives forcing the issue. Those individuals came to their views in the same way we came to ours through other people discussing events (Lynch, 1996). Worse than that ideas physically change our brains and thus our minds, the moral systems we have now are not around forever (Barrett, 2020). This potential spread of ways of acting that were previously rare may become the accepted norm, we open ourselves up to a slippery slope by allowing the politician to dirty their hands with no judgement (Meisels, 2008). This in turn has been argued Archard to spread beyond the original guilty agent but to us all, which is supported by the spread of ideas and how our brains change (Archard, 2013).

This I believe is the first type of problem of dirty hands. Where through prima facie overriding rules or a consequentialist outlook we allow ourselves through error or the unpredictable spread of intolerable acts erode the moral standing of not just the deciding agent but everyone who takes no appropriate action against them. There is a case for rule-based utilitarianism to use the scenario to generate new rules to avoid the first type of issue where the guilty are seen as not guilty but cannot escape error (Smart & Williams, 1973).

Considering the actions and consequences will always be known eventually in these scenarios (Coady, 2004). The other piece we must consider is that even though for the survival of our society we may require those in power to make difficult decisions the possibility of a loophole or slippery slope should also concern us. Our society is an infinite game, a continuous series of moves where the focus is on that continuing in the most ethical way possible, where we must find a balance between our specific actions that may end our society today and the general actions avoid it ending in the future, proponents of consequentialist and overriding rules systems must consider how their system handles both error and the spread of extreme actions over time, they do not escape dirty hands (Carse, 1986).

The second type of Dirty Hands issue is with guilty but forgivable or unforgivable act or consequences, where I consider unforgivable as a crime that is punished. This is the case of Billy Budd where the law, similar to the hard rules of a deontological moral system punish someone who has committed a usually unspeakable act but had to do so in extremis or supreme emergency in the politician's case. The issue with absolute principles is one of inaction or incorrectly punished moral action. I will not tackle non-action but note it should also be considered an action that like the action and consequences of dirty hands should be judged as not guilty, forgivable or unforgivable to avoid further gaps in our moral systems.

Unlike the infinite game of society, there are circumstances where we are locked in a finite game, where the individuals either win, in the cases discussed survive or don’t. A good example of forgiveness is R v Dudley and Stephens, an English criminal case where the survivors of a shipwreck cannibalised one of their number (Cheng, et al., 2017). They were found guilty but with a plea from the judge for clemency, eventually amounting to 6 months of jail time. Without this possibility of the forgivable crime then our moral principles that we believe allow us to do the right thing have the possibility through error just like the consequentialists to do the wrong thing, even worse they have the possibility to not be in error at all and still do the wrong thing. Captain Vere’s remorseless guilt is a prime example of someone who can hide behind rules and absolve themselves of wrongdoing by putting all the burden on the crown or some other flawed moral arbiter. In the absence of a god, we should try to construct a humane equivalent that avoids the brutality of martial law where possible and even then must have the ability to forgive (Mendus, 2007).

Some acts may indeed be necessary but unforgivable. We might need moral and psychological sacrifice to make the system work of our politicians or empowered individuals (Wijze, 2013). It may be the case that we not only need politicians who are willing to dirty their hands but they must also in some circumstances be sacrificed for the conscience of the group.

Conclusion

Yes, there is a problem of dirty hands, scenarios that leave us with the idea of inescapable wrongdoing. Whether it be from error and the spread of unacceptable norms left open by consequentialist thinking or the potential merciless results of simple rules for complex scenarios allowed by deontological systems. The problem is not with the scenarios but with our thinking about moral systems, which in order to be complete must explain to us how they deal with gaps, forgive or punish appropriately and handle errors over the infinite game that is our social existence and the finite game of our individual existence.

Table of Figures

Figure 1: Core components of the situation of Dirty Hands. 1

Figure 2: Classification of an action and the divisions that would lead to Dirty Hands coloured in blue. 3

Figure 3: Classification of an action and the divisions that would lead to Dirty Hands coloured in blue. Further elements added with Green indicating no Dirty Hands, Amber Dirty Hands but no punishment and Red as Dirty Hands with Punishment. 3

 

References

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Alexander, L. & Moore, M., 2020. Deontological Ethics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Archard, D., 2013. Dirty hands and the complicity of the democratic public. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.

Baron, M., 1986. On Admirable Immorality. Ethics, pp. 557-566.

Barrett, L. F., 2020. Seven and a half lessons about the brain. London: Picador.

Bellamy, R., 2010. Dirty hands and clean gloves: liberal ideals and real politics. European Journal of Political Theory, pp. 412-430.

Blackburn, S., 2016. Dictionary of Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Carse, J. P., 1986. Finite and Infinite Games. s.l.:Free Press.

Chappell, T., 2014. Three Kinds of Moral Imagination. In: Knowing What to Do: Imagination, Virtue, and Platonism in Ethics. Oxford: Oxford Scholarship Online.

Cheng, E. K., Hoffmann, J. L., Shadel, M. B. & Smith, P. J., 2017. The Great Courses: Law School for Everyone, s.l.: The Teaching Company.

Coady, C., 2004. Terrorism, morality and supreme emergency. Ethics, pp. 772-789.

Coady, C., 2018. The Problem of Dirty Hands. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Coady, C. & O'Neill, O., 1991. Messy morality and the art of the possible. Proceeding of the Aristotelian Society, pp. 259-279+281-294.

Floridi, L., 2011. Semantic Information and veridicality thesis. In: The Philosophy of Information. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 80-106.

Gowans, C. W., 1994. "The Angel Must Hang!" Inescapable Moral Wrongdoing in Melville's Billy Budd. In: Innocence Lost: An Examination of Inescapable Moral Wrongdoing. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hollis, M., 2009. Dirty hands. British Journal of Political Science.

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Lynch, A., 1996. Thought Contagion: How Belief Spreads Through Society: The New Science of Memes: How Ideas Act Like Viruses. New York: Basic Books.

Machiavelli, N., 2004. The Prince. London: Macmillan Collectors Library.

McConnell, T., 2018. Moral Dilemmas. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Meisels, T., 2008. ‘Torture and the problem of dirty hands’. Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, pp. 149-173.

Melville, H., 1924. Billy Budd. London: Constable & Co..

Mendus, S., 1988. The serpent and the dove. Philosophy, pp. 331-343.

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Smart, J. & Williams, B., 1973. An Outline of a system of utilitarian ethics. In: Utilitarianism: For and Against. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-74.

Stocker, M., 2003. Plural and Conflicting Values. In: Dirty Hands and Ordinary Life. Oxford: Oxford Scholarship Online.

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Tillyris, D., 2015. Learning how not to be good. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, pp. 61-74.

Walzer, M., 1973. Political action: the problem of dirty hands. Philosophy & Public Affairs, pp. 160-180.

Wijze, S. D., 2005. Tragic remorse – the anguish of dirty hands. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, pp. 453-471.

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Wijze, S. D. & Goodwin, T., 2009. Lesser Evils. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, pp. 529-540.

 

Why, for Foucault, is sex ‘the crucial target of a power organized around the management of life’?

 Introduction

Power according to Foucault, is all-encompassing. It more than any individual actions shapes our world through its unseen networks. Foucault explores some of these networks using genealogies and informs us of how knowledge, madness, discipline & punishment and sex act as discourses that allow power to manage life. The particular aspects of power and the management of life from Foucault’s work paint sex as the most pervasive, the reasons behind this are explored further within this essay. Madness and Civilisation as well as the Birth of the Clinic although later described by Foucault as being about Power are not focussed on here (Gutting, Foucault A Very Short Introduction, 2005).

Foucault’s methods

Foucault uses genealogy to establish his history of sexuality. This method is aimed at answering, what is for Foucault the key question, one that is not one simply of why something is, but rather of why we think something is the way it is and what has made us think that (Foucault, Space, Knoweldge, Power, 1986).

Defined by Foucault as “Gray, meticulous, and patiently documented it operates on a field on entangled and confused parchments, on documents that have been written over many times” (Foucault, Nietzsche, Geneology and History, 1986).

This search is not for origins but transitions of discontinuity that effect both history and the body. The results resist discovering universal laws and focus on the specific events and how the threads within link together. Unlike history, it meets histories three modalities of parody, systemic dissociation and will to knowledge which Foucault claims history itself fails to meet (Foucault, Nietzsche, Geneology and History, 1986).

These systems of discourse can be used as a means of understanding non-discursive practices. (Gutting, Michel Foucault, 2005). Foucault focusses these methods on uncovering systems of power and how they interact with knowledge, madness, discipline & punishment and sex.

Power according to Foucault

Power, generally defined as the ability of an individual or institution to achieve something (Blackburn, 2016). Although Foucault accepts the existence of the objective reality his views say objective facts within our world are merely fuel for the subjective (Foucault, Truth and Power, 1986). That rather than being the domain of the individual, power is best understood by looking at large scale phenomena as networks made up of vast numbers of minute, unconnected facts (Gutting, Michel Foucault, 2005) These facts or knowledge are not merely employed by power but form a symbiotic relationship with power to create systems of social control that are both creative and repressive (Gutting, Michel Foucault, 2005). These networks should be seen as “a multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and constitute their own organisation” (Foucault, The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality, 1981).

That once a particular discourse or set of knowledge emerges even if it provides complete truth systems of power will utilise the new knowledge to dominate or create. Although power/knowledge is seen by Foucault as all-encompassing this does not stop knowledge generated by a particular system from causing that particular system’s destruction although generally there will be resistance (Foucault, Truth and Power, 1986).

Sex according to Foucault

Arguments within this essay are limited to Foucault’s views from 17^th century on modern sex, although he did cover ancient sex this was not directly linked to an exploration of biopower and is therefore not relevant to the question at hand (Gutting, 2005).

We think of this period as a period of reduced discourse on sex, described as the repressive hypothesis, however, Foucault rejects this idea and lays out the ‘discursive explosion’ during this period (Foucault, The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality, 1981).

Christianity started a discourse on sex. With sex being a thing we must treat as a secret and not talk about in polite society but reveal to empowered individuals. At that moment priests but over time the secularisation of society would move that role from the clergy to the sciences (Foucault, The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality, 1981).

This discourse would go beyond mere actions, it would be crucial that power also gains a view on the thoughts, desires and inclinations that go along with the actions performed by individuals. (Gutting, Michel Foucault, 2005). The dawn of the social medicines that seek explanations for all actions and thoughts replaced the priest as out confession and fuelled further investigations into the thoughts, desires and inclinations not just of individuals but of populations.

This leaves us with sex as spoken about more than ever but one kept as a secret between individuals, the experts and the institutions of power that they serve (Foucault, The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality, 1981). This modern world and the discourse on sex serves to normalise the population both as objects of knowledge but also as self-scrutinising subjects (Gutting, Michel Foucault, 2005).

Management of Life

Power over life and death is no longer, according to Foucault the same as what it once was, that is the ability for a sovereign to take life. It is now, in the modern era, a conditional relationship between individuals and the state. A successful state must not just act on when “Deduction” of life is necessary but also when to “incite reinforce, control, monitor optimise and organise” (Foucault, Right of Death and Power Over Life, 1986).

That in order for a system of social control to be successful it must have institutions that optimise its bio-power through power-knowledge. This endeavour no longer involves merely the management of individuals but of populations for economic, social, political, or military purposes (Foucault, Right of Death and Power Over Life, 1986).

This makes a system that successfully manages life one that is made of individuals and institutions that:

• Avoid deducting life.
• Reinforce the existing system of domination
•  Monitor other individuals and institutions to ensure conformance to the existing system of domination.
•  Optimise biopower and power-knowledge
• Organise to ensure the spread of the existing system of domination.

Sex as the crucial target for managing life

Foucault within his wider writings looks at how knowledge, discipline and sex interact with power (Gutting, Foucault A Very Short Introduction, 2005) Knowledge, madness, discipline and sex all aid systems of social control to guide individuals as objects.

To deduct life is, by modern systems, avoided at all costs. Knowledge, Crime and sex rely on the continuation life of the individual subjected to the system of control (Foucault, Right of Death and Power Over Life, 1986). In the case of sex by ensuring that the population is normalised in various ways not just thrown away but transformed to be useful to the state. The same is true of crime which now as a medical matter is not the segregation and punishment of a dissident but the transformation of the individual into one that better serves society (Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 1979).

Reinforcement is the first key component of the management of life where a focus on sex has a significant advantage for Foucault over crime or knowledge. Crime and Knowledge allow power to act upon the body, they treat individuals as objects (Gutting, Michel Foucault, 2005). Sex on the other hand and the practice of the confession to experts and the rules that now pervade our discourse on sex not only act on individuals as objects to discipline the body but also act upon the mind of the subject (Foucault, The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality, 1981). This internalisation of the rules of society now entangled with the ideas of sex makes the mind of western people that of a ‘confessing animal’. This confessing animal unlike medieval people would not open up to their family, friends, educators but only their doctors, the supposed wielders of objective truth (Foucault, The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality, 1981). In reality, Foucault argues that these really are instruments of the view of power wearing the veil of truth.

Furthermore, the monitoring of individuals with this confessing reflex creates a panopticon of the mind (Foucault, The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality, 1981). Bentham’s panopticon concept was that it involved controlling convicts through the potential for constant observation rather than force (Calhoun, 2002). What more constant observation and monitoring could any system of power hope for than the mind of the very individuals it wishes to dominate.

A controlled discourse on sex is not there to eliminate but to ensure that sex is focussed towards economic or political purposes. That although irregularities are treated as mental illness for all ages and those sufferers helped to overcome those abnormal behaviours, behaviour that reproduces labour capacity and remains politically conservative is enforced. This growth and optimisation of biopower also extends to areas of sex often seen as immoral such as prostitution and pornography which remain as a pleasure that can be sought just in a manner that is economically or politically use and observable to the state or confessed to the state by the subject (Foucault, The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality, 1981). The modern capitalist system would not have been possible without good bodies, bodies that formed a population capable of effective production.

Organisation of those bodies into docile bodies was first explored by Foucault in discipline and punishment (Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 1979). These bodies are not selected by looking at natural properties or gifts but by acting upon all bodies equally, like clay that can be moulded into a soldier or a citizen. These methods create man as a machine one that acts, moves and behave as intended (Foucault, Docile Bodies, 1986). This however still only succeeds at creating objects for use by the state not true subjects, it leaves minds free of the effects of power. That the organising power of exerted on sex from “top to bottom, state to family, agencies of social domination to the structures that constitute the subject himself” (Foucault, The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality, 1981). The very fact that we think of sex in a less rational way means it power a way into controlling our will, a path that can never be exploited by knowledge or disciplinary techniques which remain as the rational other.

Remaining undetected

The disguise of managing knowledge of sex through so called objective truth via the ‘dubious’ science of psychiatry gives a useful means of social control (Foucault, Truth and Power, 1986). However, its greatest power is to remain undetected. Power relies on secrecy to remain unchallenged (Foucault, The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality, 1981). Despite being the subject of a discourse more prolific and varied than ever before, sex, remains a topic that is investigated for its effect on us but not how it is used to control us or how we came to think of it like we do. That the subjects forbidden nature allows power’s use of it to remain undiscovered long after power’s affect on knowledge or crime would have been undone.

This is primarily facilitated by control of and eventual removal of language. That sex more that most subjects as been easily amenable to power to at first change the circulation of speech and over time extinguish words that would make sex visibly present (Foucault, The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality, 1981). Beyond this initial control, the remaining language is the language allowed by power, one that rarely calls sex what it is and focuses on the licit if it does and never the censored illicit. That this control of discourse on sex directly affects the nondiscursive actions of individuals in a manner that is both economically and politically beneficial in managing life (Foucault, The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality, 1981).

Liberation of a paradoxical sort

Not only can power remain hidden within the realm of sex through the control of language it can propagate the ‘right’ ideas by having them seen a liberating for the individual. That the historical narrative of repression and the trend towards greater freedom. That the rebellious energy we have can be dedicated to this newfound freedom with our increased knowledge and rational understanding of an ultimately emotional domain. That not only does power act in secrecy but for us to believe that we are breaking free of power we also have to accept it does not exist. The issue with our liberation is power does set a law of sex enforced by language which is simply a law of prohibition reliant only on the punishment of the repression of sex (Foucault, The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality, 1981). Simply put, we can be free in a controlled manner that we do not believe to be controlling at all, we feel more liberated than we have ever been whilst diligently serving the current system of power.

Conclusion

Michel Foucault throughout his works has investigated the relationship power has with knowledge, crime, and sex. Through his genealogies he outlines how systems of power can deduct, incite reinforce, control, monitor optimise and organise life. Although knowledge and crime support a system of power that can perform all of these acts they are limited to affecting individuals merely as objects. Only sex is shown to be able to turn the individual into a self-normalising subject of power. Beyond creating subjects, sex’s forbidden nature allows power’s control of language to remain undetected for far longer than systems of knowledge or discipline and punishment would. Not only does power’s effect on sex remain undetected but it has had the effect of allowing us to feel liberated due to the false narrative of repression meaning even rebellious acts fit into power’s regime. These key advantages make sex, for Foucault, the crucial target for a power organised around the management of life.

References

Blackburn, S. (2016). Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Calhoun, C. (2002, February 02). Dictionary of the Social Sciences. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Retrieved from https://www-oxfordreference-com.libezproxy.open.ac.uk/view/10.1093/acref/9780195123715.001.0001/acref-9780195123715-e-1219

Foucault, M. (1969). The Archaeology of Knowledge. New York: Routledge.

Foucault, M. (1979). Discipline and Punish. Penguin.

Foucault, M. (1981). The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality. New York: Penguin.

Foucault, M. (1986). Docile Bodies. In M. Foucault, The Foucault Reader (pp. 179-187). New York: Penguin.

Foucault, M. (1986). Nietzsche, Genealogy and History. In M. Foucault, The Foucault Reader (pp. 76-100). New York: Penguin Books.

Foucault, M. (1986). Right of Death and Power Over Life. In M. Foucault, The Foucault Reader (pp. 258-272). New York: Penguin.

Foucault, M. (1986). Space, Knowledge, Power. In M. Foucault, The Foucault Reader (pp. 239-256). New York: Penguin.

Foucault, M. (1986). Truth and Power. In M. Foucault, The Foucault Reader (pp. 51-75). New York: Penguin Books.

Gutting, G. (2005). Foucault A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gutting, G. (2005). Michel Foucault. In E. Craig, The Shorter Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (pp. 280-284). New York: Routledge.

 

 

An Evaluation of Risse’s account of the emergence of the guilty conscience in Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality

Introduction

Risse gives an account of Nietzche’s Genealogy of Morality that looks at the critical role the Christian God plays in the emergence of the guilty conscience and how even Gods death will not allow us to easily overcome this harmful part of our psychology. The arguments and evidence Risse uses as well as alternative takes and criticisms from Leiter and Ridley are looked at to judge the relative worth of Risse’s account.

Risse’s Account

Figure 1: View of the merging of concepts according to Risse’s reading of the second essay of the Genealogy

Risse when looking at the emergence of the guilty conscience in the second essay of Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morality (GM) characterised the whole work as a unified theory with complex interactions. That the concepts in each of the essays are connected but the interfaces are not of a high resolution, that they will appear to the reader, in Nietzsche’s own words as ‘among thick clouds’ (Risse, 2001).

Risse’s overall position is established across two key articles, both of which will be considered when evaluating his account as well as some views from his detractors. The nature of Nietzsche’s broad but inexact and Polemic style means that both Risse’s account and the criticisms of it may be hard to hold to a single definitive interpretation. The core effect of this in Risse’s account is grasping at alternative sources such as a postcard from Nietzsche to Overbeck (Risse, 2001).

The foundation for the coming concepts rely on a few key building block that Nietzsche sets up and Risse briefly touches on. We have an inner life, a realm of self-assessment where we can reflect on our actions and thoughts as well as events we experience. Secondly, we are animals, creatures with instincts that are natural to us. Our social nature and need to compete mean that the stronger amongst us, those who would be deemed masters oppress and reduce the freedom of the majority, the slaves. This oppression forces the slaves to focus their cruel instincts inwards (Risse, 2001).

The first phase as outlined by Risse is the concept of bad conscience without the feeling of guilt. This comes about through the feeling of debt, something we feel we owe or are owed by others. It is entirely based on limited contracts that enable the flourishing of a community. Risse remarks that it is completely free of emotional or moral connotations (Risse, 2001).

The emergence of an environment where guilty conscience could manifest begins with communities and individuals success over time. As generations go by they feel greater and greater debts towards their ancestors. At a certain point, which is not clearly defined or explained by Nietzsche or Risse, these ancestors become looked at like gods. These debts do not compel people to pay them off and if they do the punishment should be considered equivalent. The punishment must match the crime (Risse, 2001).

Later it is noted that the punishments are external and for the Greeks and pre-Christians the gods are to blame and the individual is merely a blameless debtor. Although the debtor has performed an action the cause itself lies with the machinations of these deities. All of this allows for moral codes of a simpler sort that are not what Nietzsche is critiquing, such as the Greeks or Hobbes (Risse, 2001).

The ‘pushing back’, which relies on section 21 of GM is the core of Risse’s account and the one he believes introduces the guilty conscience. Its sees the idea of the Christian ‘maximal’ God and with it the idea of eternal punishment. That introduces the concept that our debts are infinite, that we owe so much we could never pay it off. Not only that but this new Christian God gives us the need to repay our debts. When merged with the bad conscience, driven by our cruel animal instincts, this conscience becomes guilty. Not only guilty of having debts but infinite debts that we are to blame for (Risse, 2001).

This section highlights the ambiguity with the German translation of ‘Schuld’, with Risse’s view that before the ‘pushing back’ GM 21 it is meant to mean debt and thereafter guilt.

The final cruel twist according to Risse is that God sees these debts and sacrifices himself for us. This does not, in fact, wipe out the debt but it compounds it further as we now all owe not just our own debts, but each bare the guilt for Gods act of ‘love’. We now find ourselves with guilt with no limit that when internalised eats away at us to the point they are all-consuming and demanding of eternal punishment. That this feeling of guilt comes to dominate and define the bad conscience (Risse, 2001).

Another way is hypothesised, beyond belief in God and post-Christian views such as those of Kant, that will tame the guilty conscience. A way that will allow us to overcome this after the death of God and our full realisation of what this means directed by a pursuit of truth. This pursuit of truth is within the Christian dogma and is the seed of its own destruction. However, Nietzsche although predicting this does not give clear outlines in GM of what this future will be like (Risse, 2001).

Areas of Contention

Figure 2:View of the merging of concepts as argued by Leiter and Ridely’s reading of the second essay of the Genealogy

Risse’s view that a reading of the GM must be internally consistent and that his is such a view is disputed. Ridley claims otherwise, claims that will be explored in more detail, but purely focussing on points of evidence there are reasons to doubt the surety of Risse. Postcards are a weak form of evidence, in as far as they represent a response to a particular question and at a slightly different time in an authors life. They are also not directly part what was ultimately published and therefore should be considered less compelling than arguments based on the text itself (Ridley, 2005).

It should also be noted that within this postcard that supports Nietzsche’s focus on the Christian God he explicitly states that Plato is to blame for everything. This does not mean that Risse’s argument of Gods importance to the guilty conscience does not still hold but indicates the sole focus of his work was not entirely on Christianity (Nietzsche, 1887).

The translation of ‘schuld’ as guilt or debt is also a point of contention in Risse’s account. That by giving a moralised version of guilt prior to the guilty conscience feeds the concept of God in before the birth of the guilty conscience but is this the correct reading. Both Ridley and Leitner reject this articulating that before and during GM 21 this can only be considered as debt and not guilt (Leiter, 2014) (Ridley, 2005). Nietzsche explicitly states that ‘I have so far set aside the actual moralisation of these concepts’ (Nietzche & Diethe, 2017) which indicates that guilt although the word used on Diethe’s translation carries more conceptual weight than Nietzsche seems to have intended based on Leiter and Ridley’s reading.

The real debate between the sides is ‘Guilt before God or God before Guilt’, that Guilty conscience is not reliant on gods or even the Christian god (Leiter, 2014) (Ridley, 2005). The alternative argument that guilt comes about not through the Christian idea of God but the actions of the masters and the internal world slaves are forced into. That the morality of the slaves that emerges as a result of the bad conscious is what pushed judgement inwards and leads to the guilty conscience. It is the guilty conscience that allows for the Christian conception of God and the Ascetic Ideal to manifest. The definition given by both Leitner and Ridley is based on an article by Simon May that has guilt as ‘an experience of reprehensible failure in response to specific actions’ (May, 1999).

Before delving further in this core question Risse, Leitner and Ridley agree that beyond the guilty conscience, Nietzsche holds out hope that soon we can look beyond the guilty conscience, get over the death of God and move towards a morality that is more beneficial to the flourishing of human excellence. However, they differ on the importance of the death of God to the change to the emergence of a new morality that is anti-Christian and anti-nihilism. With Ridley believing this comes about through the rehabilitation of the guilty conscience post the death of God and Risse arguing that we must actually look past a certain kind of guilt (Ridley, 2005) (Risse, 2005).

Risse’s Response and an Alternative

Risse sees his take on the meaning of guilt to be targeted at existential guilt rather than the local guilt, that a reprehensible failure to specific actions is too limited for the scope of Nietzsche’s argument. That Nietzsche also held this broader existential view of guilt based on the European Germanic culture within which he existed (Risse, 2005). That the pervading influence on Nietzsche and the genealogy is Christian thought and belief which is also the focus of the first and second essay’s of the Genealogy looking at slave morality and the ascetic ideal.

The cultural angle similar to the view from Nietzsche’s wider conversations is not something that is ever likely to convince Ridely or Leiter and therefore should be disregarded. This is not to say it is worthless but at the point both sides are trying to find secondary sources that are unlikely to all be consistent and resolve the ‘among thick clouds’ issue caused by the text itself the issue is likely to remain unresolved.

Risse’s comments on how there could be alternative takes on the text but explicitly highlights Risse’s is not one. This is focussed on the means by which debt to ancestors or gods would become existential guilt. That without a Christian God this could not happen (Risse, 2005). I believe along with Ridley and Leiter that the entire goal of GM is to outline the process by which the guilty conscience would emerge along naturalistic lines. That a naturalistic process the overtime combines our instincts and our inner worlds into a bad conscience, that this would make us feel debt to others and our ancestors and over time these debts would accumulate. The result of this and the parallel process of oppression and the ever inward view would lead to a moment when these come to a head and leave us with a guilty conscience that could then be given a narrative in the form of the Christian God. Although the moment of the shift is hard to define, it is harder still to argue that these naturalistic processes would always lead to the Christian God.

The response to this, touched on briefly by Risse is that his and Nietzsche’s work is quasi-historical. That for us the birth of the guilty conscience was as a result of the revelation of the Christian God. On this, it might be the case that both interpretations can coexist. The claim would be that GM lays out a process based on our own experience, that within history and our view of prehistory the birth of the guilty conscience was as a result of the emergence of Christianity. It is also true that the logical steps in the process do not need the specific notion of the Christian God but just a type of Maximal god that brings about the ‘pushing back’ to turn the bad conscience into a guilty one.

It would further be possible that you may not need a god at all, that a profound enough event that creates a feeling of debt alongside the oppression of our instincts would lead to the same result. Both sides agree that there needs to be a change to our conception of our guilty conscience but the nuances of a change in type or looking past a certain kind are not made explicit in the original text and an interpretation of rehabilitation or a view beyond seem to conclude in a similar thought. That what we need is something akin to what the Greek’s had through a new psychological mechanism that allows us to act with a bad conscience that is never dominated by guilt but does not do away with the concept entirely.

The issue is likely to always be, as highlighted by Risse that Nietzsche’s polemical style and grand project are simply beyond conclusions we can all agree on. The irony of the argument is both sides core debate is about God’s place within Nietzsche. It would seem we are still coming to terms with exactly what the death of God means or at least struggling to move on. Maybe we should seek the death of Nietzsche to free us all from our eternal intellectual punishment.

Conclusion

There is general agreement about the fundamentals of, instincts, our inner world and the debt we incur to ancestors and gods that Risse articulates in his account of GM and its conclusion that the death of God and our understanding of it will allow us to find a new better way. The key piece of Risse’s account and the one that is questioned by Ridley and Leiter is if God comes before guilt or guilt comes before God. Here the account and following defence of it relies too much on weaker external sources and unanswerable quirks of language. However, Risse’s reasons alongside that of Ridley and Leiter stand up enough to allow each to disbelieve the other due to the style and mode of thought employed by Nietzsche. Risse’s account is a good account but will never be a definitive account and will remain one among many possible interpretations. The continued debate between these individuals may say more about them than it does about Nietzsche.

Table of Figures

Figure 1: View of the merging of concepts according to Risse’s reading of the second essay of the Genealogy  1

Figure 2:View of the merging of concepts as argued by Leiter and Ridely’s reading of the second essay of the Genealogy

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