Sunday, 14 June 2020

Does the implication of the political view – that the absence of global justice need not be a matter of regret – mean that we should endorse the cosmopolitan view?

Introduction

Should we care about the lives of distant others and the systems that affect them? If we did what would be the best view to adopt to achieve Global Justice and what exactly does that entails. The two views considered are the Political and Cosmopolitan views as well as a brief look at if there are alternatives.

The Argument components and the assumptions it makes

To endorse the cosmopolitan view the concepts of global justice, the political view and the cosmopolitan view itself must be defined. The political view must be shown to cause an absence of global justice and we believe this is a matter of regret. Finally, the cosmopolitan view is the best alternative to the political view.

Therefore we shouldn’t endorse the cosmopolitan view if any of the following are true:

1.       The absence of global justice is not a matter of regret;

2.       The political view does not imply that the absence of global justice is not a matter of regret;

3.       There are no superior alternatives to the cosmopolitan view, in the case that the political view does imply the absence of global justice and it is a matter of regret;

4.       The cosmopolitan view would lead us to a world where there is still an absence of global justice;

5.       The transition to the cosmopolitan world would not cause an unacceptable increase in global injustice.

This essay will primarily focus on (2, 3, 4), however, the other possible angles should be something cosmopolitans seek to have answers for. This will also mean that this essay will assume that the absence of global justice is a matter of regret.

Global Justice

Justice has many different definitions and ways of being thought of such as commutative, distributive or retributive justice. Generally, they all seek a state of affairs where things are or are eventually put right. Commutative in the sense that rightness is sought through payment or exchange, distributive in the spread of benefits and burdens and retributive by seeking to root out and undo injustices (Blackburn, 2016). These styles of justice could be directed towards political, economic or moral issues.

Global Justice looks at Justice in its various forms from with the view that it is due to everyone. It is important to note that this focusses more on achieving justice but with no prescribed mechanism to achieve it, such as states. This allows global justice to question and explore beyond the more limited thinking in international justice, which presupposes the pre-eminence of the nation-state (Brock, 2015).

Conditions proposed by Gillian Brock for what would count as a Global Justice problem, where one or more are true, are:

1.       Entities in different states whose actions negatively affect entities in other states.

2.       Actions of a state that could burden or benefit another state.

3.       The normative actions that would require entities to take action in another state. Where normative is what we ought to do or actually do in fact (Blackburn, 2016).

4.       Problems that can only be solved through inter-state cooperation. (Brock, 2015)

‘Entities’ referred to above includes but is not limited to states, institutions, corporations and individuals. Brock’s summary includes states which are not necessarily vital to global justice but do dominate the discussion.

Global Justice, whether it be commutive, distributive or retributive, requires a theory or model that would allow us to identify problems and guide our decisions when seeking a future where everyone at this level gets what they are due. What exactly we are due is also not exactly clear from this or the definition of justice. What is considered right differs even across similar nations in the west. The difference between the US and UK on nationalised health care is a prime example of something that is considered in the latter as giving everyone their due and in the former as an unwanted extension of state power.

What isn’t in doubt is that there are events taking place today, that have been taking place for a considerable number of years, and look to continue that meet one or more of the 4 conditions. A few examples such as the huge difference between the economic purchasing power of individuals across different nations and the impoverished conditions the worse off endure across many parts of the world. The problem of extreme poverty is covered in detail by (Sen, 1988) and (Singer, 1972). Although both are decades apart their descriptions of the issues experienced by large sections of the global populations and the possible solutions, that are not beyond the wealthier nations, indicates that there is a problem. The complexity arises however when we consider which entity or individuals should solve these problems, if they even have a duty to do so and if they are even obliged to fulfil it?

The two views considered in this essay are the political and cosmopolitan view, which offer two different takes on what action we ought to take and the world we would need to construct to achieve global justice as they see it.

The Political View

The most widely known argument for the political view is made by John Rawl’s in his ‘Law of People’. Here he argues we need a system argued not from universal first principles that could legitimately apply to all but from a constructivist view built from what is. By taking this approach he looks at the existing order of communities and states and what we ought to strive towards, all grounded in the idea of justice as fairness (Rawls, 1993).

The Law of Peoples gives us a view of how liberal and hierarchical societies can coexist as well as the circumstances under which these ordered societies may interfere with unordered societies. The ordered societies would be grounded on peoples being, free independent equals, with a right to self-defence, observing non-interference, observing treaties, limiting actions in war and honouring human rights. The conditions can be fulfilled by non-liberal hierarchical societies as none of the conditions require a government that is a liberal democracy. This allows and accepts the views detailed by David Miller that a peoples idea of nationality does not always and should not have to align with liberal values (Miller, 1995).

The outline mentioned above is what Rawl’s call ideal theory, a model to which unordered societies could aim for and one which provides a society working towards mutually beneficial institutions. This does not go so far as to offer justice for individuals and through non-interference does not hold global justice as its key objective.

The unordered world therefore if it cannot or does not want to meet these conditions there must also be a non-ideal theory that offers a route to an ordered world. In the case of nations unwilling to change or outlaw regimes in Rawl’s view, the law of peoples merely offers to set those societies a goal and to act defensively both militarily and economically. For societies that wish to become ordered but lack the means are to be raised or support towards order not through distributive justice but through aid.

The result of which as argued for by Thomas Nagel is an acceptable absence of global justice, that through the injustices of unordered or ordered societies and their arbitrary institutions we achieve international justice rather than an unachievable vision of global justice (Nagel, 2005). This view is born out in reality as shown on the good country index where the liberal ordered societies are ranked as the ‘goodest’ (Anholt, 2020). The imperfection however is best highlighted by the fact that the US, supposed land of freedom is ranked next to Russia at 40th and 41st respectively.

In both theory and reality, the political view is happy to accept that the lack of global justice is not a matter of regret.

The Cosmopolitan View

For some however such as Thomas Pogge, the absence of global justice is indeed a matter of regret. He argues that the political view not only fails the worst-off individuals but does not serve individuals at all and only see groups ruled by states. The issue here is that not only is there a host of global justice problems but that states are just an arbitrary grouping with no incentives or requirement to bring about global justice who violate their negative duties to protect human rights (Pogge, 2006). An alternative to the political view is needed.

The cosmopolitan view is the idea that we are all citizens of the world. That despite differing opinions and values we form a single community (Kleingeld & Brown, 2019). This community, unlike the constructivist approach of Rawl’s, should be based on universal moral principles (Brooks, 2017). These principles are outlined as such:

1.       Everyone is subject to the same principles

2.       These principles affect us in the same way

3.       The principles are devised as to not benefit anyone arbitrarily.

These apply to all entities globally such that nations should not allow absolute or relative differences in political, economic or moral circumstances. Like the political view, these use human rights as the basis for what we as a global community should be striving for. In contrast, however, the cosmopolitan view stresses that those of us who have the means have a duty and obligation to strive for a global political and economic system that brings about justice for all. “From those according to their ability” (Marx & Engels, 2001) a phrase associated with socialist thinking that summarises this notion in an economic sense.

The precise duty and obligations we incur is still being debated but is outlined well by Leif Wenar and Debra Satz. Satz highlights that the existing global system is unjust and wealthy states and individuals have a means of rectifying the situation but thus far have not (Satz, 2006). Wenar suggests the reason behind this is the contract we feel we have with the state we exist in means we do not feel we need to go beyond this and suggests how the wealthy cans start to feel they ought to help and to promote the means of how they could achieve it (Wenar, 2003).

The expansion of the social contract to the globe rather than to a particular state or local collection of people known to us is at the core behind the removal of arbitrariness from our beliefs. This arbitrariness is to an extent promoted by the political view that uses the state as the primary means of implementing and maintaining human rights. Cosmopolitism, on the other hand, sees us all as one community that in order to implement and maintain human rights may need states or institutions but they are not a necessarily the solution and there may be other options.

Such an option is explored by Pogge, who looks at a form of distributive justice that looks to create a sort of dividend to those who should benefit from the activities of states and corporations but currently do not (Pogge, 2010).

Are there alternatives?

As noted before does indicate that the political and cosmopolitan views are different but differences between two things do not negate the existence of a third. It is possible, in light of accepting that we must abandon the political view due to being unable to bring about global justice, we should accept the cosmopolitan view but this should only be the case if it is the best option.

An alternative to both the political and cosmopolitan view is that of anarchism. Anarchism advocates a doctrine of self-governance, where states, institutions and policies are seen as corrupted and unnecessary. We would instead exist together in a voluntary cooperative venture (Blackburn, 2016).

We would instead look to the negative duties that are currently being infringed by the existing political system and seek to resolve them without obligations or orders from a state. Instead, we would all take our moral duties to one another as the authority to act. This is envisaged as a form of direct action that would bring about ‘human flourishing’ and the global justice we wish to pursue beyond ‘human structure or order’ (Fiala, 2018).

The issue occurs when looking at the instances when anarchism has been attempted and the universally disastrous consequences. Peter Marshall in his book covers anarchist thinking from Taoism in early China to later incarnations such as Murray Bookchin’s thinking (Kiernan, 1992). What they all have in common that they either did not take off or ever move beyond a single-issue group focused on political, religious or ecological upheaval (Ward, 2004).

Market Anarchism or Libertarianism is probably the most viable in terms of its ability to be implemented as markets already wield a huge amount of power. These markets would provide the services and support that the state currently provides through very literal social contracts between individuals or organisations. (Miller, 2003). Communitarian Anarchism is another form that looks for cooperation between members of a community but the ability for this to operate at scale gives the idea less credence than Market Anarchism.

Anarchist ideas, however, do not all fit within easy to understand set and would be contradictory if they could. If states based on liberal constitutions are failing to give us global justice then private tyrannies as coined by Chomsky are even less likely to succeed (Chomsky, 1970). Under these private tyrannies, it would be the least well off in society. In order to gain these contracts, wealth is required which in harder times will not be available for all. Aid internationally has not been as effective or as well supported as anyone would like (Singer, 1972). Why would we believe that our lack of benevolence would change if states did not exist. The complete removal of the state would if anything worsen the lives of people living inside states that currently are the closest to delivering economic, social and political justice to their citizens. Private tyrannies would not bring about Global Justice leaving cosmopolitanism as the best option we have in achieving this aim.

The biggest set of alternatives exist within cosmopolitanism itself. Pogge offers a framework of distributive economic justice as the core of his model of how cosmopolitanism could be implemented. This approach looks to use a resources dividend to give all citizen’s a share of the wealth generated by their states natural resources to ensure that the profits the governments of those states share the benefits of global trade with their citizens (Pogge, 2010).

However, his is not the only suggestion. Others take a more limited view to add additional rigour. Nili proposes a system that looks at a more parochial scope but does not forget how we are connected to others. This is to maintain the Kantian goal that we do not merely survive but can ‘think for ourselves’ (Nili, 2012). This sets the scope of goals for global justice to not only include a minim standard of living but for the system, we implement to not hand over too much power to the system itself. In Pogge’s vision, it is still the state that holds the power and is providing handing out which merely keeps us alive rather than in a state that might allow us to flourish.

Would the cosmopolitan view lead us to a world where we obtain global justice?

The basis of the cosmopolitan view relies on universal principles supported by utilitarian thinking. Utilitarianism is often criticised for its effect an individuals integrity and the amount of information it requires to justify decisions (Williams, 2006). These principles although flawed may lead to a world where Global Justice is achieved:

1.       All subjects live under the same fundamental moral principles

2.       These principles leave everyone with the same benefits and burdens

3.       No one is arbitrarily benefited or burdened (Brooks, 2017)

This does, however, begin, as noted before, to impinge on our freedoms. We are free to choose our government as long as it aligns with universal principles and we are economically free as long as we comply with certain duties. It seems abundantly clear that these utilitarian propositions to do align with how people feel or think about their duties and obligations to one another.

The road to implementing cosmopolitanism and its potential cost. Rawl’s deals with the difficulty of handling unordered or even ordered states that no not hold the same values as us. There is no equivalent suggestion in Pogge’s or the other cosmopolitan thinkers that have featured in this paper that have a suggestion of how to deal with these issues. Nagel notes that ‘sovereignty usually precedes legitimacy’ (Nagel, 2005). What lengths are cosmopolitans willing to go to implement their system and would they break their principles in the short term to achieve global justice in the long term and would it be worth the cost.

It may be that the ‘Law of Peoples’ if reworked along the universal approach of a cosmopolitan may come to a very similar conclusion to the political view. That although we have rights that are paramount, the ability to adhere to them necessitates a degree of non-intervention in non-compliant individuals and states.

Conclusion

Assuming the lack of global justice is a matter of regret we should reject the political view and adopt a cosmopolitan stance. The political view does not and will not lead to global justice, merely just ordered states offering international justice. The cosmopolitan view offers us a means of seeing humanity as a single community where each member has the same rights as all the others. This should compel us to build states, institutions and companies that work towards realising these values. The exact flavour of cosmopolitanism that we should adopt is not entirely clear and is not generally agreed upon. There is also additional thinking required in how to deal with a section of humanity who reject this view and would work against the measures being taken. There lies a tension between global justice and global freedom that may lead us to question our assumption that the lack of global justice is a matter of regret.

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