Introduction
Should we care about the lives of distant others and the
systems that affect them? If we did what would be the best view to adopt to achieve
Global Justice and what exactly does that entails. The two views considered are
the Political and Cosmopolitan views as well as a brief look at if there are alternatives.
The Argument components and the assumptions it makes
To endorse the cosmopolitan view the concepts of global
justice, the political view and the cosmopolitan view itself must be defined.
The political view must be shown to cause an absence of global justice and we
believe this is a matter of regret. Finally, the cosmopolitan view is the best
alternative to the political view.
Therefore we shouldn’t endorse the cosmopolitan view if any
of the following are true:
1.
The absence of global justice is not a matter of
regret;
2.
The political view does not imply that the absence
of global justice is not a matter of regret;
3.
There are no superior alternatives to the
cosmopolitan view, in the case that the political view does imply the absence
of global justice and it is a matter of regret;
4.
The cosmopolitan view would lead us to a world
where there is still an absence of global justice;
5.
The transition to the cosmopolitan world would
not cause an unacceptable increase in global injustice.
This essay will primarily focus on (2, 3, 4), however, the other
possible angles should be something cosmopolitans seek to have answers for.
This will also mean that this essay will assume that the absence of global
justice is a matter of regret.
Global Justice
Justice has many different definitions and ways of being
thought of such as commutative, distributive or retributive justice. Generally,
they all seek a state of affairs where things are or are eventually put right. Commutative
in the sense that rightness is sought through payment or exchange, distributive
in the spread of benefits and burdens and retributive by seeking to root out
and undo injustices
Global Justice looks at Justice in its various forms from with
the view that it is due to everyone. It is important to note that this focusses
more on achieving justice but with no prescribed mechanism to achieve it, such
as states. This allows global justice to question and explore beyond the more
limited thinking in international justice, which presupposes the pre-eminence
of the nation-state
Conditions proposed by Gillian Brock for what would count as
a Global Justice problem, where one or more are true, are:
1.
Entities in different states whose actions
negatively affect entities in other states.
2.
Actions of a state that could burden or benefit
another state.
3.
The normative actions that would require
entities to take action in another state. Where normative is what we ought to
do or actually do in fact
4.
Problems that can only be solved through inter-state
cooperation.
‘Entities’ referred to above includes but is not limited to states,
institutions, corporations and individuals. Brock’s summary includes states
which are not necessarily vital to global justice but do dominate the discussion.
Global Justice, whether it be commutive, distributive or
retributive, requires a theory or model that would allow us to identify
problems and guide our decisions when seeking a future where everyone at this
level gets what they are due. What exactly we are due is also not exactly clear
from this or the definition of justice. What is considered right differs even
across similar nations in the west. The difference between the US and UK on
nationalised health care is a prime example of something that is considered in
the latter as giving everyone their due and in the former as an unwanted
extension of state power.
What isn’t in doubt is that there are events taking place
today, that have been taking place for a considerable number of years, and look
to continue that meet one or more of the 4 conditions. A few examples such as
the huge difference between the economic purchasing power of individuals across
different nations and the impoverished conditions the worse off endure across
many parts of the world. The problem of extreme poverty is covered in detail by
The two views considered in this essay are the political and
cosmopolitan view, which offer two different takes on what action we ought to
take and the world we would need to construct to achieve global justice as they
see it.
The Political View
The most widely known argument for the political view is
made by John Rawl’s in his ‘Law of People’. Here he argues we need a system
argued not from universal first principles that could legitimately apply to all
but from a constructivist view built from what is. By taking this approach he
looks at the existing order of communities and states and what we ought to strive
towards, all grounded in the idea of justice as fairness
The Law of Peoples gives us a view of how liberal and
hierarchical societies can coexist as well as the circumstances under which
these ordered societies may interfere with unordered societies. The ordered
societies would be grounded on peoples being, free independent equals, with a
right to self-defence, observing non-interference, observing treaties, limiting
actions in war and honouring human rights. The conditions can be fulfilled by
non-liberal hierarchical societies as none of the conditions require a government
that is a liberal democracy. This allows and accepts the views detailed by
David Miller that a peoples idea of nationality does not always and should not
have to align with liberal values
The outline mentioned above is what Rawl’s call ideal
theory, a model to which unordered societies could aim for and one which
provides a society working towards mutually beneficial institutions. This does
not go so far as to offer justice for individuals and through non-interference
does not hold global justice as its key objective.
The unordered world therefore if it cannot or does not want
to meet these conditions there must also be a non-ideal theory that offers a
route to an ordered world. In the case of nations unwilling to change or outlaw
regimes in Rawl’s view, the law of peoples merely offers to set those societies
a goal and to act defensively both militarily and economically. For societies
that wish to become ordered but lack the means are to be raised or support towards
order not through distributive justice but through aid.
The result of which as argued for by Thomas Nagel is an
acceptable absence of global justice, that through the injustices of unordered
or ordered societies and their arbitrary institutions we achieve international
justice rather than an unachievable vision of global justice
In both theory and reality, the political view is happy to
accept that the lack of global justice is not a matter of regret.
The Cosmopolitan View
For some however such as Thomas Pogge, the absence of global
justice is indeed a matter of regret. He argues that the political view not
only fails the worst-off individuals but does not serve individuals at all and
only see groups ruled by states. The issue here is that not only is there a
host of global justice problems but that states are just an arbitrary grouping
with no incentives or requirement to bring about global justice who violate their
negative duties to protect human rights
The cosmopolitan view is the idea that we are all citizens
of the world. That despite differing opinions and values we form a single
community
1.
Everyone is subject to the same principles
2.
These principles affect us in the same way
3.
The principles are devised as to not benefit
anyone arbitrarily.
These apply to all entities globally such that nations
should not allow absolute or relative differences in political, economic or
moral circumstances. Like the political view, these use human rights as the
basis for what we as a global community should be striving for. In contrast, however,
the cosmopolitan view stresses that those of us who have the means have a duty
and obligation to strive for a global political and economic system that brings
about justice for all. “From those according to their ability”
The precise duty and obligations we incur is still being
debated but is outlined well by Leif Wenar and Debra Satz. Satz highlights that
the existing global system is unjust and wealthy states and individuals have a
means of rectifying the situation but thus far have not
The expansion of the social contract to the globe rather
than to a particular state or local collection of people known to us is at the
core behind the removal of arbitrariness from our beliefs. This arbitrariness
is to an extent promoted by the political view that uses the state as the
primary means of implementing and maintaining human rights. Cosmopolitism, on
the other hand, sees us all as one community that in order to implement and
maintain human rights may need states or institutions but they are not a necessarily
the solution and there may be other options.
Such an option is explored by Pogge, who looks at a form of
distributive justice that looks to create a sort of dividend to those who
should benefit from the activities of states and corporations but currently do
not
Are there alternatives?
As noted before does indicate that the political and
cosmopolitan views are different but differences between two things do not
negate the existence of a third. It is possible, in light of accepting that we
must abandon the political view due to being unable to bring about global
justice, we should accept the cosmopolitan view but this should only be the
case if it is the best option.
An alternative to both the political and cosmopolitan view
is that of anarchism. Anarchism advocates a doctrine of self-governance, where states,
institutions and policies are seen as corrupted and unnecessary. We would
instead exist together in a voluntary cooperative venture
We would instead look to the negative duties that are
currently being infringed by the existing political system and seek to resolve them
without obligations or orders from a state. Instead, we would all take our
moral duties to one another as the authority to act. This is envisaged as a
form of direct action that would bring about ‘human flourishing’ and the global
justice we wish to pursue beyond ‘human structure or order’
The issue occurs when looking at the instances when
anarchism has been attempted and the universally disastrous consequences. Peter
Marshall in his book covers anarchist thinking from Taoism in early China to later
incarnations such as Murray Bookchin’s thinking
Market Anarchism or Libertarianism is probably the most
viable in terms of its ability to be implemented as markets already wield a
huge amount of power. These markets would provide the services and support that
the state currently provides through very literal social contracts between
individuals or organisations.
Anarchist ideas, however, do not all fit within easy to
understand set and would be contradictory if they could. If states based on
liberal constitutions are failing to give us global justice then private tyrannies
as coined by Chomsky are even less likely to succeed
The biggest set of alternatives exist within cosmopolitanism
itself. Pogge offers a framework of distributive economic justice as the core
of his model of how cosmopolitanism could be implemented. This approach looks
to use a resources dividend to give all citizen’s a share of the wealth generated
by their states natural resources to ensure that the profits the governments of
those states share the benefits of global trade with their citizens
However, his is not the only suggestion. Others take a more
limited view to add additional rigour. Nili proposes a system that looks at a
more parochial scope but does not forget how we are connected to others. This
is to maintain the Kantian goal that we do not merely survive but can ‘think
for ourselves’
Would the cosmopolitan view lead us to a world where we
obtain global justice?
The basis of the cosmopolitan view relies on universal
principles supported by utilitarian thinking. Utilitarianism is often criticised
for its effect an individuals integrity and the amount of information it requires
to justify decisions
1.
All subjects live under the same fundamental moral
principles
2.
These principles leave everyone with the same
benefits and burdens
3.
No one is arbitrarily benefited or burdened
This does, however, begin, as noted before, to impinge on
our freedoms. We are free to choose our government as long as it aligns with
universal principles and we are economically free as long as we comply with
certain duties. It seems abundantly clear that these utilitarian propositions to
do align with how people feel or think about their duties and obligations to
one another.
The road to implementing cosmopolitanism and its potential
cost. Rawl’s deals with the difficulty of handling unordered or even ordered
states that no not hold the same values as us. There is no equivalent suggestion
in Pogge’s or the other cosmopolitan thinkers that have featured in this paper
that have a suggestion of how to deal with these issues. Nagel notes that ‘sovereignty
usually precedes legitimacy’
It may be that the ‘Law of Peoples’ if reworked along the
universal approach of a cosmopolitan may come to a very similar conclusion to
the political view. That although we have rights that are paramount, the
ability to adhere to them necessitates a degree of non-intervention in non-compliant
individuals and states.
Conclusion
Assuming the lack of global justice is a matter of regret we
should reject the political view and adopt a cosmopolitan stance. The political
view does not and will not lead to global justice, merely just ordered states
offering international justice. The cosmopolitan view offers us a means of seeing
humanity as a single community where each member has the same rights as all the
others. This should compel us to build states, institutions and companies that
work towards realising these values. The exact flavour of cosmopolitanism that
we should adopt is not entirely clear and is not generally agreed upon. There
is also additional thinking required in how to deal with a section of humanity
who reject this view and would work against the measures being taken. There
lies a tension between global justice and global freedom that may lead us to
question our assumption that the lack of global justice is a matter of regret.
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