Evaluation of the success of Nietzsche’s genealogical critique of Morality

 

Introduction

If you were to design a machine for endless debate and disagreement you would still be less successful than Nietzsche. His critique of morality, On the Genealogy of Morals, ‘GM’ from here onwards, paints a picture of the complex road that led us to our current value systems and the characters and instincts that caused it. The following evaluation looks at how effective Nietzsche was with this critique, arguing the although he succeeds in part there are also areas where more recent advances in our understanding of ourselves offer a better explanation.

Evaluating Nietzsche

Nietzsche’s preface sets out what he wishes to achieve in producing a polemic, “a piece of writing or a speech in which a person strongly attacks or defends a particular opinion, person, idea, or set of beliefs” (Cambridge Dictionary, 2023), on morality via the method of genealogy, the conditions that would cause humans to invent Good and Evil. The Genealogy built upon his previous work and Nietzsche contends that one must have an emotional connection to them, not just one of knowledge (Nietzsche, 2012). As such we must carefully consider the way in which we evaluate the work and even then, as noted by Spector, there are so many disparate views on Nietzsche, “one cannot agree with them all”, and we should be suspicious of the source itself given the result it has caused (Spector, 1995).

Generally, we consider morality or ethics as a system of values which enable us to determine the rightness or wrongness of thoughts and actions (Taylor, 2005). Although this can be associated with myriad areas, I will aim to limit the evaluation to specifically what Nietzsche criticises and the method he uses to do it.

‘Genealogy’ is a form of historical critique that, by tracing the components of an idea, it reveals their true nature and the actors involved, often providing a new previously hidden perspective. Nietzsche’s method relies on psychological explanations of our behaviour and thoughts on supposedly well understood beliefs, such as religion (Hill, 1991). As such the ‘history’ Nietzsche presents is unlikely to be accurate but rather it sets out a series of developmental stages ideas go through within an individual or a group. It is in the use of the concepts Nietzsche lays out and not his ability as a historian that should be the benchmark of his success.

General Themes of GM

In GM Nietzsche asks: “How was it that humility and meekness, modesty and denial of the flesh – and, in a way, the wholesale denial of the self – were turned into values? How can one explain that these became the compass-setting gauges by which people steered the courses of their lives?” (Nietzsche, 2012)

The answer to those questions forms part of his no-saying phase after his yes-saying phase: the latter being completed by Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Nietzsche, 2007). GM is more of a blueprint for ‘overcoming’ morality, that human, all too human invention (Large, 1995).

The scope of the critique, which heavily targets Christian, Kantian and Utilitarian philosophy, is actually aimed at the ideas that each of them have that cause damage to an individual or a societies will to life, ultimately damaging ‘higher individuals’ for the benefit of ‘lower individuals. The value systems that GM highlights that should be mistrusted are ones that consider themselves to be universal, give individuals free will (Free Will Thesis), visible inner worlds (Transparency of Self Thesis) and claim that we are created equal (Similarity Thesis) (Lieter, 2020).

Value systems do have the effect of differentiating the good from the bad, or evil, which would create a caste of higher or lower individuals. The value system would be brought about by a wider system of beliefs which means the level to which you are convinced is based on your acceptance of Nietzsche’s belief that the ‘will to life’ should be our primary measure of value over other possible objectives . The general point is that the differentiation and origin of value systems must be questioned. That corrosive norms can erode societies, or at the very least change them, is a persuasive notion (Lieter, 2020).This is not to say we should not have obligations and agreements between one another but the basis for these should not be universal or anti-life (Geuss, 1997).

The existence of - or nonexistence of - free will based on the reasons Nietzsche puts forward, that we lack freedom as we are ‘causa sui’ or caused by, are simple and have been both supported and countered with neither side gaining a clear upper hand (Nietzsche, 2012). However, the view that we are a fixed type of person is not entirely true; our brains tune and prune themselves throughout their life and large changes in individuals do occur (Barrett, 2020).

I concur with Nietzsche’s rejection of the Transparency of Self Thesis, that we do not have perfect understanding and control of our inner world, as seen through both akratic and recalcitrant behaviour (McCumiskey, 2020) (McCumiskey, 2022). Our thoughts come when they wish, not when we wish for them (Lieter, 2020). As such, any attempt to build a value system that relies on us understanding all of our thoughts and actions will be lead us to make poor judgements.

Just as the view that there is not a universal morality within GM, the view that these systems rely on showing equality amongst individuals is also well argued for (Geuss, 1997). We are all different in some aspect whether it be our physical appearance, thoughts, or actions. We may be grouped but a grouping capable of joining us all together under one standard is easily dismissed, supporting Nietzsche’s view that any value system that exalts a sameness across all that reality does not support through observation leading to the rejection of the Similarity Thesis.

GM builds a grand and often imprecise narrative. Although the core narrative is persuasive, it is difficult to grasp at exactly why, especially if we look at recorded history. This kind of system is well described by Hofstadter in Gödel, Escher, Bach where he show how there are generally two type of system, one that gives some of the truth and no falsehood and another that gives us all of the truth but some of its results are false (Hofstadter, 1979). GM overall falls into the second type as it aims at trying to capture all aspects morality needs but in doing so any insights gained from detailed analysis needs be used with caution.

The ‘slave revolt’ in morality

“The truth of the first essay is the psychology of Christianity: the birth of Christianity out of the spirit of ressentiment, not, as is believed, out of the ‘spirit’, – a countermovement in its very essence, the great revolt against the dominance of noble values” (Nietzsche, 2007).

The second essay starts with English psychologists seeking immortal truth but not in the right way. They look at the concept of goodness and not those who are good; they look too deeply and do not question the concept of good itself. Nietzsche argues that those who are truly good, the nobles, have been brought down and their virtues forgotten by our ‘herd instinct’ and that tells us we need no ego. Part of the ruling class become priestly, panderers to the poor, who use their worst instincts against them and the nobles. This process takes place over many years and has been brought about by many doctrines (Jews, Christians, Plebs), driven by resentful creativity due to a ‘lack of’ rather than a triumphant striving. Leaving what was previously good, or triumphant not just as bad but as evil, as those systems lead to denying or causing suffering to others. Noble ideas can lead to bad individuals such as Napoleon but unlike slave morality they do not lead to evil ones (Nietzsche, 2012).

In his strategic view Jay argues this is untenable, the revolt is for the weak to harm the powerful, resentment is great enough to cause action. He asks why would the weak use a roundabout way of harming the powerful? I would argue Jay has straw-manned Nietzsche’s conceptual framework as a described plan enacted by an individual or group consciously as opposed to the end result of a more complex system, Wallace notes this but still disagrees (Wallace, 2007). The study of the spread of emergent behaviour through the spread of ideas or memes is now well understood and would support Nietzsche’s characterisation (Lynch, 1998). Even so there are specific political movements that now do table new sets of values. For example, Populism, best personified by Donald Trump in American politics (Hunston, n.d.), or Social Justice movements started by critical race theory (Britannica, 2022); both propose a ruling elite group that are not just bad but are evil in some way and portray negative traits of which the members of the down-trodden party hold positive opposite traits (Mueller, 2016).

Jay has a preferred proposal: his ‘Expressive interpretation’ which details how resentment at a moral psychological level would lead to the slave revolt, to which I agree is a reasonable view as peoples will and emotions when aggregated could drive them to take action in order to change their circumstance (Wallace, 2007).

The emergence of bad conscience and guilt

“The second essay gives the psychology of the conscience: conscience is not, as is believed, ‘the voice of God in man’, – it is the instinct of cruelty that is turned inwards after it cannot discharge itself outwards anymore. Cruelty is first brought to light here as one of the oldest and most persistent underpinnings of culture” (Nietzsche, 2007).

Nietzsche explains how Humans are the animal that can promise, that as a group can have a morality of custom. These promises we can make to ourselves and others and through our memory brings about the emergence of our conscience. This conscience can be made to punish those who feel they owe another or themselves. This creditor/debtor relationship goes from practical trading to a suffering on behalf of those who are owed; the suffering becomes the payment. We are given a way out not through paying debts but increased suffering. A further step paints suffering as the purpose of life, and such a view is attributed to Christianity. Nietzsche argues we should actually aim for prosperity amongst creditors to forgive or ignore debts. Instead, doctrines of revenge disguised as justice demand payment, even when not needed, and these are entrenched through codification into religious doctrine and laws. The codified system of constraints forces individuals’ energies to be internalised causing our instincts for freedom to produce a bad conscience towards our thoughts and actions. For all these internalised debts now need an ultimate creditor, so we create God (Nietzsche, 2012).

In analysing the second essay Risse provides a view from Nietzsche that explains how a complex structure must have isolatable roots, of which each of the essays identifies a root of Morality. He agrees with Nietzsche about the fundamentals of instincts, our inner world and the debt we incur to ancestors and gods and that the death of God will allow us to find a new better way (Risse, 2001).

Risse’s account is questioned by Ridley (Ridley, 2005) and Leiter (Leiter, 2014). The question is if  whether God comes before guilt or guilt comes before God? Risse’s account and following defence of it relies too much on weaker external sources and unanswerable quirks of language, leaving the likelihood of common consensus on this part of the genealogy unlikely to ever resolve itself (McCumiskey, 2021).

A more interesting critique of the emergence of the bad conscience is the more modern idea of the Selfish gene. Richard Dawkins builds a compelling case for how genes, via an evolutionary process, would survive if they cause altruistic behaviour that allows them to spread in a population (Dawkins, 2016). This presents a counter to Nietzsche’s idea of the guilty conscience, firstly by showing altruistic behavioural drivers as pre-dating Christianity or indeed any concept of God, and secondly by showing our fundamental instincts and drivers are not necessarily aggressive, much rather that they are tuned towards effective cooperation. We can sacrifice for the greater good of the collective and accept that some will be masters whilst others become slaves if we as a whole prosper.

The ascetic ideal

“The third essay gives the answer to the question of how the ascetic ideal, the priestly ideal, acquired such incredible power despite the fact that it is the detrimental ideal par excellence, a will to the end, a decadence ideal” (Nietzsche, 2007).

Nietzsche explains how we will nothingness rather than not will. This instinct leads us to ascetic ideals. He paves the road to those ideals through a range of characters. Philosophers, for example, start to see things as only if they can be seen as such without interest or emotion, as things in themselves. This, Nietzsche asserts, is a case of philosophers denying life to themselves in order to suffer for the truth, a truth they may never even be able to achieve. These types of movement start to be guided by priests who spread these resentful and hostile ideals to harness the power of slaves. They place life as against death, preserving life but limiting it. The limiters then hold themselves up as something to strive for, a gold standard over nobles, but they only anaesthetise rather than cure, keeping their followers forever ill. Nietzsche also explains how philosophers and scientists look like they are the answer, but in reality they are just the next phase of the ascetic ideals as they merely have a metaphysical faith not a love of life, affirming another world but not the one we must live in (Nietzsche, 2012).

These Ascetic Ideals adopted by philosophers, artists, priests and most people are driven by striving for optimal conditions and to maximise their power. Given that suffering is unavoidable and meaningless, suffering is unbearable; anything that gives meaning to suffering is something life will choose as meaningless suffering is the worst fate we can suffer (Leiter, 2014). This leaves us convincingly, if we leave to one side for the moment the premise that humans are inherently cruel and all of life is suffering, the need for new ideals to replace the ascetic ones. Science, immoralism and Antichrists look promising but Nietzsche exposes each as ascetic in disguise. It is reasonable that science cannot produce values beyond pursuing truth. Leiter highlights that the changes to science to seek knowledge not just truth and to accept that truth will always be beyond its reach gives us the best chance to move forward alongside a proposal that we should seek ‘amor fati’, a love of fate. Han-Pile points out key issues with amor fati for agapeic love as our values once transfigured would not seek such a kind of love (Han-Pile, 2011).

The third essay is vastly speculative beyond its effective arguments against our existing value systems and how they are unlikely to truly deliver for us but offering no deeply insightful critiques of Morality.

Conclusion

Nietzsche’s critique is not exhaustive but well focussed on key roots of our concept of morality. The powerful genealogical method feels like it can give us all the truth but makes it hard to see its falsehoods. The Free Will Thesis, Transparency of self-thesis and Similarity Thesis convincingly make us question what we need to understand from any system of values we subscribe to. The first essay’s revolt as real-world corollaries that we could apply Nietzsche’s framework to question and understand todays views on Morality. The second essay relies on an underlying cruelty that does not seem to fit with the latest understanding of what drives our instincts. With the third essay once more raising key questions we should pose to any value system. Nietzsche succeeds in his nay-saying but not all of his reasoning is valid or sound. His limited yes-saying is too cryptic to leave us with a clear route forward and will remain a topic of debate until the end of time.

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Can Akrasia Ever Be Rational

 Introduction

Every day we like to think we are in control of our thoughts and actions and that they are leading to the goals we and others set. However, on those occasions when we feel we ought to get up but hit snooze for the nth time or when we fail to act when required, are these weaknesses of will ever rational? By looking at the components of Akrasia and rationality some criteria for that circumstance are developed with models of reality and a scenario to see if Akrasia can be rational.

Definition of Akrasia

Akrasia is a condition where although we know what it would be best to do, we do something else. Translated literally as a ‘lack of self-control’ but is generally considered to be more of a weakness of will that leads to us acting contrary to our judgement particularly when actions are guided by our moral principles or long-term goals (Steward, 2005). This has been debated since the Socratic equation, which proposed knowing a thing to be good means we desire it (Blackburn, 2016). Furthermore, not only do we desire it, but it would be impossible for us not to perform the action which we know to be best (Steward, 2005). The nuance in the Protagoras is that if we do not act on our thoughts then we didn’t really know them to be best (Jowett, 2020).

Logically formulated “Joseph did f rather than e, even though he was convinced that e was the better thing to do all things considered” (Stroud & Svirsky, 2019)

Definition of Rational

Behaviour, beliefs, arguments, policies, and other exercises that make sense, are appropriate or required or in accordance with some acknowledged goal can be rational (Blackburn, 2016). When considering Akrasia the form of rationality that is most applicable is our notions of practical reasoning. The form of reason that directs, motivates, plans, evaluates, and predicts actions. It also includes how we define rational ends and guidance on how action should be guided given multiple ends (Hampton, 2005).

More specific definitions of subjective vs objective rationality and other methods of adding degrees exist but I will only argue for it meeting rationality's lowest or general criteria (Tappolet, 2016).

Criteria by which Akrasia could be rational

To construct a route to arguing that Akrasia can be rational a set of criteria that allow at least one instance of it to be considered both Akratic and rational is needed. Firstly, the link between our thoughts or actions, that the Socratic equation of knowing something to be good means taking actions towards it must be broken. This allows for Akrasia to be true.

The second piece must be our inability to know everything. Socrates’s challenge lies in us thinking one thing and being unaware of our true beliefs. Although it is possible for us to not know our own beliefs there is also information that we do not have or are not aware of best described by theories on Information which assert we do not have perfect knowledge but a constant battle against uncertainty (Adriaans, 2020). This would allow for our thought of possible actions, that at the time do not appear rational in fact have a greater probability of reaching our goals than those we are conscious of.

Our imperfect knowledge must also be considered when looking at our goals. They are not fixed but constantly challenged by what we learn from experiences we encounter day to day. A scenario where a better goal is discovered from an action or lack of action may in hindsight be considered a more rational choice.

Changing goals and thoughts means that in hindsight rational action can appear out of what would be considered irrational at the time. This combined with the complexity of our lives presents us with not just a singular goal but many and our ability to perfectly call what goals, thoughts and actions are rational at the time to the end of time but rather themselves gain or lose certainty based on increased understanding.

Akrasia would be rationale if:

1. ·       Thoughts do not have to lead to actions
2. ·       Uncertainty can lead us to better goals, thoughts, and actions allowing each of them to be rational or irrational
3. ·       We are more than just our conscious self, those unconscious systems are capable of actions we could consider rational
4. ·       Not all goals and thoughts are immediately expressible
5. ·       Rational thoughts and actions can be considered as such in hindsight if they move towards a goal

Goals, Thoughts, Actions and Errors

To explore what could meet the criteria a few Models of ourselves and our world can help link the elements, the following models use Archimate which can encapsulate processes, information, systems and their relationships which gets close to the concepts we need to break down any part of reality (McCumiskey, 2020).

Figure 1: Breakdown of Information flow within an Animal in a timebound world

Figure one shows a world that is composed of many parts, one key piece is conscious animals such as humans and another is time that breaks up that world into a continuous series of differing states. We perform actions from one state to another based on the sensory information we receive about the world and our conscious thoughts about it. We also have during each moment the influence of memories which provide us with a compressed view of past sensory information and thoughts. A broadened structure of one that is used in the perceptual model of emotions (McCumiskey, 2020). This provides a convincing view that our thoughts and actions are not inextricably linked but can in certain instances act independently of one another.

As seconds, minutes, hours, days and months pass our unconscious systems continuously take actions of which some are influenced by our conscious responses to experiential information. These actions, or in the occasional instance of akrasia, non-actions are based on information. This constant loop of thoughts and actions in our strange loop can over time exhibit goals towards future states of the world and ourselves (Hofstader, 2007). Given the constraint of time, we sometimes take actions with very little conscious thought, of which I refer to instances of behavioural and communicative actions towards ourselves and others rather than mechanical actions like walking. Over time we may rethink our pattern of behaviour, but we can perform actions with very little or no thought with a pattern that leads us towards our goals or in such a way that we might start to change our goals based on feedback. Our weakness of will is never more present than our inability to change these behaviours, we may think all we want when depressed is that we should get up, clean our room, or go out with friends but it does not mean that we do this, sometimes for months on end. It is however this strange force that also seems to drive us towards people we like or love, a lack of self-control for our good as well as bad.

This is similar to Tappolet’s view of a self-monitoring Reason-responsive agent that is not just tracking reasons that cross past the agent’s mind but are actively acted upon was sufficient confidence in a particular course is warranted (Tappolet, 2016).

Figure 2: Mental Information Breakdown

Those unconscious actions that we observe to understand our pattern of behaviour is not the only type. I submit that we also have ideas we are entirely conscious of but cannot express in natural language to either our mind or others as broken down by figure 2 (McCumiskey, 2020).  This however although made up of our mental information from our memory and sensory information at the time could not be used to explain Akrasia as it is not a loss of will or self-control. They are however our means of looking back and assessing all of our actions, even the ones that were unconscious, more like sensory perceptions of emotions than things that felt like a conscious actions.

All of the former is complicated further by us having myriad goals and thoughts which some of the time overlap or compete with one another for primacy. Complex frameworks have been developed, such as those used by rational choice theory, the theory that mathematical models can predict and guide our economic, societal and behavioural choices (Hardin, 2005). Those frameworks base a lot of their understanding on Game Theory and other mathematical models that capture the possible decisions in certain scenarios. Within these scenarios there is room for error that each of our conscious or unconscious thoughts that lead to action have a probability of success, an impact should they fail, the proximity of influence and value were they to succeed (Axelos, 2010). This puts into question the stance that rationality comes from judgements that then proceed to actions rather than a more complex loop that involves unconscious and conscious interaction and a trend towards our goals over time with the trend being where the true rational or irrational assessment should lie (Stroud & Svirsky, 2019).

Constraining our rationality to just conscious thought and not allowing actions from our unconscious would potentially limit the set of possible actions that would allow us to achieve our goals. We cannot easily analyse when performing actions, whether our gut feelings, inexpressible ideas or articulated points will allow us to obtain a good goal or show our goal was flawed and lead us to a better end. The less time we have the even more uncertain the correct path may appear leading us to reasonably go with a course that at the time feels like a loss of control or a weak-willed action but may in fact over time be shown to be the rational action to have performed.

Scenario

Scenarios, where the criteria are met, are best articulated by stories like Adventures of Huckleberry Fin (Tappolet, 2016), The Secret Life of Walter Mitty and more recently Dreamwork’s How to Train your Dragon.

How to Train Your Dragon is set on the island of Berk one of the main characters Hiccup is brought up in a town of Vikings whose culture revolves around killing dragons. To win his father's approval and greater standing in the town hiccup sets a goal to kill a dragon. Unlike the rest of the town, Hiccup is focused on technological problems and logical thinking.

During an attack on the village by dragons, Hiccup utilises one of these contraptions, successfully bringing down a dragon. Hiccup upon finding where the dragon fell realises, he only wounded the creature. With it, at his mercy and with all his long-held goals set to be fulfilled he struggles to plunge his dagger into the dragon’s beating heart and instead frees it. His thoughts and actions do not align, and he does not know why he couldn’t bring himself to do it. At this moment the rationality of this action can be questioned as he has failed the town and placed himself in mortal danger of reciprocity from the dragon.

He is also spared and from this moment starts learning more about the dragon, Toothless, and begins to strike up a friendship. One which ironically makes him the best dragon wrangler in training but also puts into question the town’s aggressive stance towards the dragons.

He can only articulate this later when pushed why he couldn’t do it, finally explaining that he believes that the dragon and he were the same and by implication the town and the dragons. Both were just trying to survive and have a common enemy. Their main goal is the same and by sparring with Toothless they must now all change their thoughts about the Dragon threat to a friendlier position if they are to survive.

Upon defeating this enemy Hiccup achieves his father’s and the town’s approval and with the dragons now part of the town their world is significantly better. Without Hiccup’s weakness of will, followed by questioning his thoughts and learning to articulate them none of them ever move to a better place. When looking back the action he did not perform when he lost his self-control to execute his goals was entirely rational and the best action to move him and the town towards being able to survive.

This does not make all instances of Akrasia rational, but it does make it possible. Given this, there are further considerations around the degree of rationality Akrasia can be attributed with (Tappolet, 2016) and the framework for practical reasoning that would allow us to obtain the best chance of becoming aware of those moments (Hampton, 2005).

Conclusion

Akrasia can be Rational, our brains are not entirely conscious but capable of actions due to the necessity of time. This can lead to moments when we cannot master our actions with our conscious will leading us to do f rather than e, even though he was convinced that e was the better thing to do all things considered (Stroud & Svirsky, 2019). Those moments however when looked back on as a trend towards a goal can be the best possible action we could have taken. Explored briefly through the akratic action of Hiccup in How to Train your Dragon, which led to the best possible outcome. The potential errors in all of our goals, thoughts and actions leave room for actions to be rational and our conscious thoughts to be irrational despite feeling like they are at the time. Our frameworks of practical reasoning need to account for this and be moved to look at the strange loop of information that our minds are to ensure they do not lead to irrational actions by just looking at point decisions based on an assumption of perfect knowledge.

Figures

Figure 1: Breakdown of Information flow within an Animal in a timebound world. 2

Figure 2: Mental Information Breakdown. 3

 

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What is meant by ‘dirty hands’, and is there a problem of dirty hands?

Introduction

We all have difficult decisions to make, sometimes those decisions although difficult to not violate or strain our moral judgments. However some decisions do, they put us and others in a scenario where a right or wrong action is harder to settle upon. Dirty Hands is one of these types of scenario. This essay will look to lay out the components of dirty hands scenarios and understand if it represents a problem for a or all of our moral systems.

What is a scenario of ‘Dirty Hands’

Figure 1: Core components of the situation of Dirty Hands

From the Greeks to Shakespeare and beyond people have been writing about scenarios where hands are dirtied (Wijze, 2005). Clear formulations of why it is the case that it is the right thing to do wrong arrived with Machiavelli and his guidance for Princes (Tillyris, 2015). With plays that offer a view on the problem by Sartre’ and Brecht heavily influenced the modern version of the scenario (Nielson, 1996). The most influential of which is by Michael Walzer who proposes a situation where someone must choose between two options, both of which would be morally wrong (Walzer, 1973). This breach of normative or prima facie moral rules, where prima facie is considered to be a genuine obligation that may have to yield to other pressing higher-ranked obligations based on utility or some other sort of ranking and normative as what we ought to do (Blackburn, 2016).

Beyond Walzer there are a range of views that look to understand the exact implications of the scenario of dirty hands, with some concluding that there is a problem of ‘dirty hands’, whilst others deny that (Coady, 2018). It is probably best understood by breaking the scenario of dirty hands into its component parts.

The scenarios given across the majority of the sources referenced in this paper generally use a political scenario but some use events in ordinary life. For example, the act of terror to be stopped by a politician (Meisels, 2008) or Herman Melville’s Billy Budd which sees Billy murder Claggart who sought his death through mutiny laws (Melville, 1924). What they have in common is that they are not common occurrences and generally include impactful acts and consequences.

The agents within the dirty hands scenario are normally described as the one who has the decision to make, the politician or Captain Vere, the collection of innocent agents that will be affected by the decision, such as the people or Billy Budd and the hostile agent, the terrorist or Claggart who has brought about the scenario that forces the decision. It is possible that the hostile agent may not be an agent but merely an environmental force that demands action.

The available actions to the agent are usually laid out as one when no action will incur a steep cost, usually the lives of the innocents involved and some options that go against normative prima facie moral actions but seem necessary or obligatory to avoid the worst consequences. The politician is faced with torturing the terrorist to obtain the location of a bomb and Vere’s is faced with condemning innocent Billy to death to uphold the maritime law. There is always a set of possible options that to prima facie or normative moral rules or principles would be considered wrong. Those actions must not only be usually wrong but in the specific scenario be both justified and obligatory (Stoker, 1991). When there are 2 or more options both the act and the consequences are assessed to understand which is the lesser evils (Wijze & Goodwin, 2009)

Dirty hands scenarios are not always considered a moral dilemma. Just acts that are usually moral but the bad act is akin to a moral obligation and therefore there may be a good act but one that is not always good depending on the consequences (Wijze, 2005). Taking a Dilemma as a scenario where the agent is required to enact one of two or more actions the doing of which see the agent condemned to moral failure; no matter what they do (McConnell, 2018).

The consequences of doing nothing as mentioned before normally have a steep cost. The consequences of the actions however would dirty the hands of the agent seen as one of guilt when judged against prima facie, normative or existing legal standards as well as the psychological cost and loss of integrity to the individual who took the action. The politician saves the innocent but tortures an individual and Captain Vere’s protects the law but kills the innocent billy.

The rightness, wrongness and dirtying of hands require a Moral System. The cases referenced and debated are seen through the paradigm of a Deontological or Consequentialist theory of ethics. The Deontological System looks at the morality of our choices, critically that these choices should be judged by their own merit and not the state they bring about. This stands in contrast to a consequentialist view that focuses on the end state and not the choice, ‘the means justify the ends (Alexander & Moore, 2020).For example, a deontological approach would claim that both Vere’s and the Politician are wrong to torture or kill an individual or an innocent. A consequentialist would argue that by upholding the maritime law more lives would be saved, just like the lives saved by the politicians decisive action.

The actual outcome is important within Machiavelli’s work as only effective immoral acts are acceptable, we do not want ineffective rulers (Machiavelli, 2004). The effectiveness or intended effectiveness is what most of the papers focus on but this dimension should not be forgotten.

The final piece of the puzzle is that, having determined that if the agent has performed a wrong action, there is the question as to whether the agent with dirty hands should be punished or not and what that punishment should be. This is explored by Susan Mendus through the case of Billy Budd and the conclusion that Vere’s has done wrong and carries this remorseless guilt to his grave (Mendus, 2007). The politician in a nation that has laws against punishment would receive whatever sentence the judiciary body would deem appropriate, explored in the most detail by Meisels and the possible guilt those judiciary bodies or the public would incur by not punishing immoral or illegal acts (Meisels, 2008).

Figure 2: Classification of an action and the divisions that would lead to Dirty Hands coloured in blue

A dirty hands scenario is one that leaves us with the idea of inescapable wrongdoing. That there are a set of actions, each of which are wrong in a normative or prima facie sense but necessary to avoid a greater evil and the agent that makes the decision may be effective or ineffective with the chance of judgement from the law or their own conscience.

Is there a Problem?

Figure 3: Classification of an action and the divisions that would lead to Dirty Hands coloured in blue. Further elements added with Green indicating no Dirty Hands, Amber Dirty Hands but no punishment and Red as Dirty Hands with Punishment

Walzer concludes that these situations cause a problem due to the fact that in these instances certain agents appear that they must perform an act generally considered to be wrong in order to do the right thing and that it is their obligation in the role that they hold to do it, yet they have ‘dirty hands’ from doing so (Walzer, 1973). Is it wrong that to do right we must do wrong?

Nielson agrees there are circumstances where individuals or groups have to perform actions that under normal circumstances would be completely unacceptable, often choosing the lesser evil (Nielson, 1996). However, in his response to De Wijze, Nielson outlines that despite the fact that these actions are normally wrong in the circumstances given they are the right. This is generally the consequentialist viewpoint or that of overriding moral rules, that having calculated the utility of the outcomes, we arrive at an action that is the right one, torture the terrorist or kill Billy.

Each of the consequentialist systems or the complex set of overriding rules rely on the decision-making agent or those judging them after that fact making the correct decision. To do this they have to understand the set of available actions, the likely outcomes and the chances of one set leading to the other. There is also after the scenario is complete the information on the actual outcome and whether it was indeed the right thing to do, either through the effectiveness of the action taken and the state attained or how we morally judge the events after the fact.

Information is, however, never perfect, seen as a reduces uncertainty but never entirely eliminating it (Adriaans, 2021). The point at which an act utilitarian performs their calculations of the best action will not always be correct. There is a chance that after the fact we relook at what we did and realise that it was not overall good than some other options that were on the table. We land on whether the act performed in trying circumstances is no longer simply not guilty but guilty in a forgivable sense or unforgivable and requiring of punishment. These errors are not just based on physical information but how semantic information is true or not true and even through reason never entirely uncertain (Floridi, 2011). A response might be to invoke Mackie’ Moral Error Theory and claim that Moral properties could not exist in reality and therefore my trying to create the statement s in the first place is the mistake (Kalf, 2019). However, I feel this would be a difficult stance for a consequentialist to take as the foundation of utilitarianism is the use of information about states to make moral judgements.

Considering the actions and consequences will always be known eventually in these scenarios (Coady, 2004). We must consider if even though for the survival of our society we may require those in power to make difficult decisions the possibility of an error should also concern us. Furthermore spread of new ways of thinking spread, the very scenarios we discuss for Dirty Hands generally have agents with opposing objectives forcing the issue. Those individuals came to their views in the same way we came to ours through other people discussing events (Lynch, 1996). Worse than that ideas physically change our brains and thus our minds, the moral systems we have now are not around forever (Barrett, 2020). This potential spread of ways of acting that were previously rare may become the accepted norm, we open ourselves up to a slippery slope by allowing the politician to dirty their hands with no judgement (Meisels, 2008). This in turn has been argued Archard to spread beyond the original guilty agent but to us all, which is supported by the spread of ideas and how our brains change (Archard, 2013).

This I believe is the first type of problem of dirty hands. Where through prima facie overriding rules or a consequentialist outlook we allow ourselves through error or the unpredictable spread of intolerable acts erode the moral standing of not just the deciding agent but everyone who takes no appropriate action against them. There is a case for rule-based utilitarianism to use the scenario to generate new rules to avoid the first type of issue where the guilty are seen as not guilty but cannot escape error (Smart & Williams, 1973).

Considering the actions and consequences will always be known eventually in these scenarios (Coady, 2004). The other piece we must consider is that even though for the survival of our society we may require those in power to make difficult decisions the possibility of a loophole or slippery slope should also concern us. Our society is an infinite game, a continuous series of moves where the focus is on that continuing in the most ethical way possible, where we must find a balance between our specific actions that may end our society today and the general actions avoid it ending in the future, proponents of consequentialist and overriding rules systems must consider how their system handles both error and the spread of extreme actions over time, they do not escape dirty hands (Carse, 1986).

The second type of Dirty Hands issue is with guilty but forgivable or unforgivable act or consequences, where I consider unforgivable as a crime that is punished. This is the case of Billy Budd where the law, similar to the hard rules of a deontological moral system punish someone who has committed a usually unspeakable act but had to do so in extremis or supreme emergency in the politician's case. The issue with absolute principles is one of inaction or incorrectly punished moral action. I will not tackle non-action but note it should also be considered an action that like the action and consequences of dirty hands should be judged as not guilty, forgivable or unforgivable to avoid further gaps in our moral systems.

Unlike the infinite game of society, there are circumstances where we are locked in a finite game, where the individuals either win, in the cases discussed survive or don’t. A good example of forgiveness is R v Dudley and Stephens, an English criminal case where the survivors of a shipwreck cannibalised one of their number (Cheng, et al., 2017). They were found guilty but with a plea from the judge for clemency, eventually amounting to 6 months of jail time. Without this possibility of the forgivable crime then our moral principles that we believe allow us to do the right thing have the possibility through error just like the consequentialists to do the wrong thing, even worse they have the possibility to not be in error at all and still do the wrong thing. Captain Vere’s remorseless guilt is a prime example of someone who can hide behind rules and absolve themselves of wrongdoing by putting all the burden on the crown or some other flawed moral arbiter. In the absence of a god, we should try to construct a humane equivalent that avoids the brutality of martial law where possible and even then must have the ability to forgive (Mendus, 2007).

Some acts may indeed be necessary but unforgivable. We might need moral and psychological sacrifice to make the system work of our politicians or empowered individuals (Wijze, 2013). It may be the case that we not only need politicians who are willing to dirty their hands but they must also in some circumstances be sacrificed for the conscience of the group.

Conclusion

Yes, there is a problem of dirty hands, scenarios that leave us with the idea of inescapable wrongdoing. Whether it be from error and the spread of unacceptable norms left open by consequentialist thinking or the potential merciless results of simple rules for complex scenarios allowed by deontological systems. The problem is not with the scenarios but with our thinking about moral systems, which in order to be complete must explain to us how they deal with gaps, forgive or punish appropriately and handle errors over the infinite game that is our social existence and the finite game of our individual existence.

Table of Figures

Figure 1: Core components of the situation of Dirty Hands. 1

Figure 2: Classification of an action and the divisions that would lead to Dirty Hands coloured in blue. 3

Figure 3: Classification of an action and the divisions that would lead to Dirty Hands coloured in blue. Further elements added with Green indicating no Dirty Hands, Amber Dirty Hands but no punishment and Red as Dirty Hands with Punishment. 3

 

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